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ABSTRACT
PRIVATIZATION IN TURKEY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE
PRIVATIZED COMPANIES IN CEMENT INDUSTRY
F. YEŞİM AKCOLLU 
Master of Business Administration 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. ZEYNEP ÖNDER 
June 1997
Privatization is any transaction that reduces a government’s ownership in or control over a 
public enterprise or results in the liquidation and sale of assets of a public enterprise. Turkish 
experiment of privatization attracted researchers’ attention because of being an interesting case 
with an interactive triangle: relationship among the state, the society, and the international 
system. State Owned Enterprises were founded because of the desire of the Turkish 
Government to produce in the sectors where private sector was not producing. However, the 
f)erformance of state owned enterprises deteriorated over time. Privatizing the ones with poor 
performances seemed to be the best solution. Turkish Government had made a strong 
commitment to privatization after a new government established in 1983. However, no 
progress worth to mention about had been made until 1989. Privatization efforts have gained 
momentum afterwards. This study examines the performance of the privatization in cement 
industry by Wilcoxon rank tests and t-test by comparing the pre- and post-privatization 
performances according to several characteristics (such as profitability, operating efficiency, 
output, employment, leverage). According to the test results, privatized cement companies have 
no significant improvement after privatization in terms of performance measures other than 
sales efficiency.
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ÖZET
TÜRKİYE’ DE ÖZELLEŞTİRME VE
ÇİMENTO SEKTÖRÜNDEKİ ÖZELLETİRMENİN PERFORMANS ANALİZİ
F. YEŞİM AKCOLLU
İşletme Enstitüsü Yüksek Lisansı
Tez Danışmanı: Yard. Doç. Dr. ZEYNEP ÖNDER
Haziran 1997
Özelleştirme, devletin bir kamu iktisadi teşekkülündeki payını ya da kontrolünü azaltan, veya 
kamu iktisadi teşekkülünün varlıklarının satımı veya tasviye edilmesi ile sonuçlanan her türlü 
işlemdir. Türkiye’nin özelleştirme çabaları, devlet, toplum ve de uluslararası sistemden oluşan 
bir üçgen olması nedeni ile araştırmacıların dikkatini çekmektedir. Kamu İktisadi Teşekkülleri, 
özel sektörün üretim yapmadığı alanlarda üretim yapmak için kurulmuşlardır. Fakat, zamanla 
performansları bozulmuştur. Kötü performans gösteren Kamu İktisadi Teşekküllerinin 
özelleştirilmesi en iyi çözüm olarak görülmüştür. Türk Devleti, 1983’te yeni hükümet 
kurulduktan sonra özelleştirme için kesin karar almıştır. Fakat, 1989 yılına kadar bahsedilmeye 
değer bir gelişme elde edilmemiştir. 90’h yılların başlarında özelleştirme çabaları hız 
kazanmıştır. Bu çalışma, çeşitli kriterlere (karlılık, işlemsel verimlilik, çıktı, istihdam, mali 
kaldıraç ) göre çimento şirketlerinin özelleştirme öncesi ve sonrası performanslarını 
karşılaştırmaktadır. Kullanılan yöntem t-testleri ve Wilcoxon sıralama testleridir. Çıkan test 
sonuçlarına göre özelleştirilen çimento şirketlerinin performanslarında satış verimliliği 
dışındaki kriterlerde dikkate değer bir gelişme olmamıştır.
Anathar Kelimeler: Özelleştirme, Çimento Sektörü, Performans, Wilcoxon Sıralama Testi
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I. INTRODUCTION
" Any form of ownership is inevitably imperfect. Market failures can lead to divergence 
between profit and welfare objectives in private firms. Government failure leads to 
divergence between political / bureaucratic and welfare objectives in state-owned 
enterprises. Monitoring failure leads to divergence between the objectives of the enterprise 
managers and their principles, whether the principles are private owners or political 
superiors. The effects of ownership changes on welfare will depend upon the relative 
magnitudes of these imperfections. As a first approximation, privatization can be viewed as 
a means of reducing the impact of government failure, albeit at the risk of increasing 
market failures, and of changing monitoring arrangements. " (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991)
Privatization is a process of change with political as well as socioeconomical dimensions; 
it is not a panacea for the ills of the economies in the developing world. The success of the 
newly conceived economic policies is anchored in the ability of the key actors to promote 
privatization by following effective macroeconomic policies and by building powerful 
coalitions of the public, politicians, bureaucrats, and special interest groups.
This study intends to analyze the privatization programs in Turkey including an analysis of 
performance of the privatized companies in the cement industry. It gives some information 
about why privatization is important in Turkey. Worldwide privatization efforts are also 
mentioned to make a comparison.
Second part gives the explanation of privatization and methods of privatization. Trade-off 
among the different methods of privatization and the methods according to the investor 
types are investigated. Also, summarizes the results of several studies examining the 
impact of privatization programs in several countries. According to the summary results of
the privatization programs in the world, the countries show different characteristics. Thus, 
we can not derive a generalization of the privatization applications and results worldwide.
Third part examines privatization process in Turkey. First, it gives information about the 
background and composition ol State Economic Enterprises (SOEs) some of which were 
privatized and/or in the process of privatization. Then, the deteriorating performance of the 
SOEs and the main reasons of this deterioration are discussed. Then comes the 
privatization efforts ol Turkish Government including objectives. The steps and objectives 
of privatization process in Turkey since 1983 are discussed. Steps taken in this process, 
obstacles of privatization program in Turkey and World Bank Assistance projects to help 
privatization process in Turkey are also mentioned. At the end of this part, the present 
status and future privatizations are also evaluated.
Fourth part summarizes the measure of performance of privatization at the firm level. 
Several literature survey results are presented in order to reveal the efforts to measure the 
performance of the privatization both in Turkey and in the world.
Fifth part examines the performance of the privatized companies in Turkish cement 
industry. First, a brief explanation of the cement industry in Turkey is given. Cement 
industry constitutes an important aspect of privatization program in Turkey since it is the 
first industry where all state owned companies except very small two companies have been 
privatized. The six first privatized cement companies, namely Afyon, Ankara, Balıkesir, 
Söke, Trakya and Niğde are included in the sample. Several hypotheses regarding to the 
performance of these companies are tested. Their performance is characterized by their 
profitability, operating efficiency, output, leverage and employment level. Several proxies 
are used to measure these characteristics. For example, 'return on sales', 'return on assets', 
'return on equity' ratios are used to measure profitability. For operating efficiency, ‘sales 
efficiency’ and ‘net income efficiency’ are used. Performance in terms of output is 
measured by ‘real sales’. ‘Total number of employees’ are used to measure employment 
level while ‘debt to assets’ and ‘long-term debt to equity’ ai'e used to measure leverage. 
The hypotheses are tested using t-test, Wilcoxon rank test and Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
For measuring the performance of each company, t-test is employed. For the overall 
performance of the six, both the t-test and Wilcoxon rank tests are employed. T-test and
Wilcoxon signed rank test are used to make of comparison between the two means. 
Wilcoxon rank test is employed to measure the difference between the two medians. The 
results of t-test and Wilcoxon rank tests are consistent although the sample size is not very 
large. According to the test results, there is no significant improvement after privatization 
in terms of profitability, output, leverage. In terms of operating efficiency, sales efficiency 
improved after privatization while net income efficiency has no significant improvement. 
Employment level in all companies decreases in post-privatization years as expected.
II. PRIVATIZATION PROCESS
Privatization is defined as any transaction that reduces a government’s ownership in or 
control over a public enterprise or results in the liquidation and sale of assets of a public 
enterprise. (World Bank, 1994) The most common objectives worldwide for privatization 
can be stated as follows:
• To minimize the state involvement in the economy,
• To increase both the operating and financial performance of the companies, thus 
increase the overall efficiency,
• i’o reduce the deficit and burden of debt,
• To foster market competition and discourage monopoly,
• To raise country’s economic credibility and attract investment.
II. 1 Methods of Privatization
There are several methods of privatization. The following are the most commonly used
methods (Nellis, 1996) :
• Direct Sale to Outside Investors: This method involves the sale of the privatized 
company to one or more buyers. Buyers can be both foreign and domestic. For 
example, in Germany, each company can be sold to at least two buyers.
• Management / Employee Buyout: Managers and employees are given the equal 
chances with others to be buyers of their companies. Sometimes, they have serious 
advantages over the outsiders.
• Voucher or Mass Privatization: In this method. The vouchers are used rather than 
money as the medium to purchase shares in companies. Vouchers are given or sold to 
domestic citizens at very low prices, thereby eliminating the shortage of domestic 
capital that is the core problem with the sale approach.
• Spontaneous Privatization: The privatization can take place indirectly, for example by 
the liquidation of assets or by selling some of the assets.
These methods of privatization have some advantages and disadvantages. Nellis (1996) 
expresses the trade-off among these privatization methods for large firms (Table 1). For 
example, direct sale is good in order to achieve better corporate performance and provide 
better access to capital and skills. On the other hand, it is slow and not very feasible.
Voucher privatization can overcome perceived unfairness, the shortage of domestic capital, 
and the difficulty of placing monetary values on state assets. It can proceed rapidly and can 
simultaneously stimulate the development of market institutions and create new 
stakeholders. However, the outcomes in terms of corporate governance and better access to 
capital and skills are blur.
Management-employee buyouts are fast and easy to implement, both from political and 
technical standpoints. Insider ownership can be more equitable and efficient than outside 
ownership.
The outcomes of spontaneous privatization either depend on other constraints or have 
negative results. It does not generate government revenue and does not provide a better 
access to capital and skills.
Table 1: Trade-Off Between Privatization Methods
Objectives
Better Speed & Better More Greater 
corporate Feasibility access government fairness 
governance to revenue
capital
and
skills
Methods
Sale to Outside 
Owners
Management-
Employee
Buyout
Equal Access Voucher 
Privatization
Spontaneous
Privatization
+
+
+
+
Source; Nellis J. (1996), "Overall look to Privatization Worldwide", The World Bank Seminar
’+’: The method is proper for that kind of objective.
: The method is not proper for that kind of objective.
’?’: The result highly depends on other constraints and it is hard to know the impact of the 
method without investigating other effects.
The selection of the privatization method depends on not only objective in the privatization 
process, but also the targeted investor in the privatized company. Sui9mez (1993) evaluates 
methods of privatization according to target investors. For example, if the aim is to allow 
as many as possible investor to take advantage of the privatization, then the most 
appropriate solution is equal-access voucher privatization. However, if they are willing to 
give the priority to the employees and the management who have been working for the 
company for years, then the best method is management-employee buyout.
Table 2: Sales Methods of Privatization According to the Target Investor
TARGET INVESTOR(S) SALES METHOD
Citizens -Equal-Access Voucher Privatization
Domestic and Foreign Portfolio Investors -Selling at ISE
-Equal-Access Voucher privatization 
-Block Sale
Management and Employees -Management- Employee Buyout
Domestic and Foreign Firms -Joint-Venture 
-Majority Shares Sale
Other -Leasing
-Management Contract 
-Asset Sale 
-Minority Shares Sale
Source: Sui^mez H., (1993), Privatization Applications in Turkey and in the World, National Productivity 
Center Pres.s
Nellis (1996) states the main common difficulties worldwide in the privatization process as 
follows;
• Corporate Governance: It is very difficult to change things that are malfunctioning into 
things functioning well such as obtaining reasonable price at a reasonable time frame.
• Capital Markets: Registry, trading and minority rights are the critical issues in capital 
markets to consider. In most cases, insider becomes dominant and it becomes very 
difficult to hold minority rights.
• Crime. Corruption and Regulation Difficulties: While the companies are privatized, in 
many cases, corruption and crime take place during the privatization process. Also, 
enacting the laws for the privatization process is very difficult. Benchmarking is very 
difficult since each country’s case differs from the others’ in many aspects.
• Business Advisory Services: During privatization process, the business advisory 
services are highly needed. Their experience in the subject matter is crucial.
II.3 Worldwide Privatization Efforts
A massive privatization effort has been taken worldwide. For example, between 1980 and 
1991, 6,800 state owned companies were privatized in the world. Privatization was the 
number one priority in the countries facing transition economics such as Old Russia, 
Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Macedonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia in early 90's. 
In these countries, 30,740 firms were privatized between 1990 and 1994 (Nellis, 1996).
Currently, worldwide, 25 % of the total number of the companies are in the privatization 
portfolio of the governments. Those companies in the privatization portfolio constitute 
35% of the total value of the firms worldwide (Nellis, 1996).
IL2 Problems in Privatization Process
Table 3 summarizes the results of several studies about privatization program in different 
countries (Vemon-Wortzel and Wortzel, 1989). According to that study, we can not 
conclude that there are similarities among the results of the privatization programs of the 
developing countries because of the scope of the privatization programs.
A study evaluating Turkish privatization programs found that there had been no real 
privatization until 1989 in Turkey, only the preparations for privatization program had 
been completed. According to his results, the main reason of the Turkish Government to 
initiate privatization program is the desire to increase efficiency and achieve economic 
growth. Turkish Government preferred to give the first priority in privatization program to 
the state owned enterprises that are easy to sell to get funding in short period of time.
Having examined the worldwide privatization process, next part explains the privatization 
process in Turkey. The third part of this study explains the background of state owned 
enterprises, privatization efforts up to now and future privatization plans, obstacles in the 
process. World Bank funded projects to help Turkish Government in privatization process.
Table 3: Privatization Programs in Some of the Developing Countries
Country Author(s) Privatized
Organizations
Reasons for Privatization, 
Criteria
Achievements until 
1989
Africa Callaghy
Wilson
-Special
Selection
-Budget burden 
-Lack of foreign 
exchange 
-Economic crisis 
-Inefficiency 
-Abolishment of 
colonialist political 
economy
-Isolation of debit in 
small and medium 
scale industry 
-Some management 
contracts 
-Improvement of 
SOEs
Bangladesh Chishty -Textile
Companies
-Creating proper 
investment environment
-Competition 
-Better performance 
than performance of 
the rest of the state 
companies
Brazil Kapstein -Agriculture 
firms that had 
gone bankrupt 
and bought by 
the government
-To get rid of state 
involvement from the 
economy
-Successful 
-Improvement in the 
traditional 
government sector
Chile Marshall -Banks
-Production
firms
-Agriculture
firms
-Protection -Fast privatization 
created a system with 
monetary problems
Jamaica Kennedy -Food
companies
-Local
transportation
-Economic growing -Limited privatization 
made SOEs sensitive 
to the market forces
Malezia Al-haj et 
al-
-General
thought
-To provide equality -Many monopolies
Pakistan Igbal -Flour firms 
-Rice firms
-Restructuring -Not clear
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Table 3 (Continued): Privatization Programs in Some of the Developing Countries
Country Author(s) Privatized
Organizations
Reasons for Privatization, 
Criteria
Achievements until 
1989
Philippines Haggard n.a. -Arrangement of the 
unproductive assets of the 
state banks
-Improving efficiency
-Very little 
privatization
Peru Ortiz cle 
Zavalios
-Various -Economic growing 
-Efficiency
-At the planning
stage
Sir Lanca Jayasing-he -Various -Weak performance -In textile companies, 
profitability instead 
of social utility
South Core Kao -Commercial
banks
-Sector efficiency -Unsuccessful 
-Government is still 
effective on interest 
rates and credits
Thailand Pakkasem -City
transportation
-Efficiency -Better service
Turkey Leeds -The
companies that 
are easy to sell
-Efficiency 
-Economic growing
-No privatization 
-Preparations for 
privatization are 
completed
Venezuela Kelly de 
Escobar
-Various -Weak performance 
-Stronger private sector
-Restructuring 
-Inefficiency in 
private sector 
companies
Source: Vemon-Wortzel, H. and Wortzel L. H., (1989), “Privatization: Not the Only Answer” , World 
Development. Vol. 17, No:5, 633-641, Great Britain
II
I. PRIVATIZATION PROCESS IN TURKEY
The State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were established since national independence war to 
function in the areas where the private companies were not producing. However, the 
performances of the SOEs deteriorated over time and they started to become a financial 
burden for the government . Because of the deteriorating performance of the SOEs, 
government stressed the need for improved performance of SOEs, including the shedding 
of SOEs through privatization and liquidation.
The privatization process was initiated in the early 1980s. Until the end of that era, no 
significant improvements are made. Since 1990, the privatization process gained 
acceleration. The Turkish experiment with privatization has been attracting the researchers’ · 
attention since it is an interesting case with an interactive triangle: the relationship among 
(he state, the society, and the international system at a particular point in time. In this part, 
first State Owned Enterprises are examined. Then privatization efforts of Turkish 
Government, future plans of privatization, obstacles to apply the program. World Bank 
projects to provide technical assistance and funding to the privatization program constitute 
the rest of this part.
IIl.l Back2round of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs)
III. 1.1 Composition and Importance
Slate Owned Enterprises can be classified in three broad categories (World Bank, 1993):
• State Economic Enterprises (SEEs): They are the joint-stock companies wholly 
owned by the Treasury. An SEE reports to a ministry which is typically responsible for the 
policy-making and the co-ordination of the activities of the SEEs in an industry or sector.
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Portfolios of the SEEs include a state bank which was to provide financing for the sector. 
Some of the SEEs are state monopolies.
• Wholly-Owned subsidiaries of SEEs and joint ventures with other private parties 
holding equity participation more than 50 %.
• Privately-owned or contracted enterprises with equity participation of the state 
through SEEs or subsidiaries.
The SOEs are mostly very large enterprises in the crucial sectors of the economy. Some of 
them are natural monopolies while others are virtually monopolies because of the very 
large size of investment required for the entry. Table 4 summarizes the important ratios of 
the SEEs in the manufacturing sector and their relative size in the Turkish economy. 
Although the investment made in the SEEs is high when compared to the sector’s total, the 
SEE’s profit share is very low compared to the sector’s total.
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Table 4: Selected Figures on the Performance of the SEEs in the Manufacturing Sector
Selected Ratios 1988 1989 1991
SEE’s exports / total exports 10.40 16.99 19.33
SEE’s imports / total imports 33.07 32.34 34.40
SEE’s employment / total employment 3.70 3.60 3.70
SEE’s fixed investment / total public fixed inv. 44.7 40.72 35.89
SEE’s fixed investment / total investment 21.33 14.18 15.80
SEE’s financing requirement / GNP 2.60 1.64 1.40
SEE’s borrowing requirement / GNP 2.71 2.58 2.36
SEE’s financing surplus / GNP 2.50 2.42 2.10
Foreign project loans / SEE’s borrowing 59.00 35.85 41.00
Budgetary transfer to SEE’s / GNP 1.00 0.72 0.45
Budgetary transfer to SEE’s / budget expenses 4.80 3.16 1.99
SEE’s consolidated profit / GNP 1.10 0.65 0.10
Source: The World Bank, 1992, Privatization Implementation Assistance and Social Safety Net Project, Staff 
Appraisal Report, 4.
IIL1.2 Operations and Performance of SOEs
In the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey turned to SOEs as other developing countries such as 
Egypt, Tunisia, Tanzania did in order to provide that the private sector seemed incapable of 
producing. However, dissatisfaction with inefficiency and costs of SOEs has been very 
strong. Rather than making a contribution to the economics of Turkey, these enterprises 
turned out to be a substantial drain.
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Table 5 shows the key performance indicators of the SOEs between 1985 - 1992. The 
financial performance of the SOEs worsened over time. The return on capital employed fell 
from 17.2 percent in 1985 to -9.8 in 1992. Particularly poor performers include TTK (Hard 
Coal Mines), ТЕК (electricity), TDCl (steel), and Siimerbank, all of which are consistently 
large loss-makers. Together, all loss-making SOEs accumulated losses of 1.9 % of GNP in 
1990 which rose to 4.2 % of GNP in 1992. Economic efficiency were lagging behind the 
private sector. In 1992, the labour productivity in the SOEs were only the 46 % of that in 
the private, while the marginal efficiency of capital was only about one-third of the total.
Table 5: Key Performance Indicators of SOEs (1985 - 1992) (% of GNP)
Performance Indicator 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Operating Surplus 3.6 1.5 1.1 0.4 0.8 -0.6 -5.2 -5.4
Return on Capital Employed
(%) 17.2 14.3 12.7 10.6 10.3 6.7 5.3 -9.8
Free Cash Flow -6.4 -7.4 -12.5 -8.5 -8.8 -4.0 -5.4 -3.9
Financial Leverage Ratio 2.3 2.5 1.9 2.8 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.2
Earnings Decline Cover (%) 85.2 78.8 70.1 68.8 61.1 50.4 31.9 30.1
Industrial SOEs in Top 500
Firms Employment (% total) 58.0 57.0 55.0 55.5 54.5 53.4 54.5 55.0
Fixed As.sets (% total) 69.6 69.0 68.7 69.8 68.9 65.9 60.0 53.5
Value Added (% total) 47.0 46.0 44.8 47.0 45.8 41.6 35.4 36.7
Labour productivity (% of
private) 86.0 85.0 75.0 86.0 90.0 62.3 45.8 46.1
Source: The World Bank, 1992, Privatization Implementation Assistance and Social Safety Net Project. Staff 
Appraisal Report, 4.
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The main reasons for the poor performance of the SOEs can be stated as follows;
• Noncommercial Objectives; The Government has used SOEs to achieve a range of 
noncommercial objectives, including income redistribution, regional development, 
employment creation, and industrial and infrastructure development. Also SOEs are 
used by the government parties as the political power and a tool to increase their vote 
potential.
• Soft Budget Constraints; Unable to adjust to changing market demands, SOEs have 
survived only because of the soft-budget constraint. This has led to a pervasive lack of 
financial discipline. The availability of guarantees IVom the Treasury on foreign 
borrowings, loans and rediscounts from the Central Bank, and commercial bank loans 
have given SOEs preferential access to credit without facing the risk of bankruptcy.
• Legal and Institutional Framework; In 1984, Decree Law 233 was issued to govern the 
establishment and operation of virtually all SOEs in Turkey. In practice, deficiencies in 
that law effectively perpetuate outside control over SOEs through annual budgets and 
financing programs that require rectification by other public agencies. The new 
privatization law has been enacted only recently, on November 1994 as the law No; 
4046.
> Pricing Policies; Although SOE prices are regulated by the authority of the SOE 
management by Decree Law 233, Council of Ministers can still set the prices and rate 
schedules. In practice, the legislation did not lead to full pricing autonomy. Also, the 
compensations of noncommercial duties imposed on the enterprises are generally paid 
with a lag of at least one year and without interest.
Personnel Regime; To circumvent the constitutional requirement to have SOEs 
managed by civil servants. Decree Law 233 introduced the possibility of hiring staff 
under one-year renewable contracts. This was done in order to attract better qualified 
people by offering higher salaries. However, the High Court of Justice ruled this
III.1.3 The Main Reasons for the Poor Performance of the SOEs:
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practice unconstitutional. Thus a category was introduced: civil servants with contracts. 
Salaries were not linked to the performance. Since 1989, the wage negotiations in 
SOEs have become highly politicized, leading to a more than doubling of the real wage 
workers in the two years to June 1992. At that date, the increases were moderated 
subsequently, with real wages increasing by 9 %. In addition, over employment policy 
of the government caused the personnel costs to increase a lot. While the number of 
personnel increased substantially, no extra value is added in terms of profitability and 
elficiency. New recruitments in the SOEs are seen as a way to decrease the 
unemployment rate by government.
• Market Regulation: Many large SOEs enjoyed the monopoly situation. The 
Government had to establish regulatory mechanisms to enhance efficiency and foster 
substantive private sector participation in those activities. Fundamental structural 
changes in the sector, including privatization, are needed to achieve an enduring 
improvement in performance.
Because of the reasons stated above, SOEs became a financial drain for the government 
and the need for privatization of the SOEs are deeply felt.
111.2 Privatization Efforts
After the national independence war that was ended in 1923, Turkey had no view of the 
respective roles of the private and public sectors. Government was bound until 1929 with 
the promises given with the capitulations. Much of the economy other than infrastructure 
were in public hands. Commerce was preferred over trade. The military and bureaucratic 
leaders of the time had a distrust of the private investors and the external world. On the 
other hand, they were favouring emulating the west to strengthen Turkey’s position. 
Therefore, state capitalism seemed to be the best solution for them. The state had a leading 
role in heavy industry (iron and coal) and light industry (textiles) while commerce and 
agriculture were left to the private sector. However, by the time as stated in previous 
section, SOEs became a financial burden for Turkish Government for the reasons stated in 
section III. 1.3.
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The military regime, which held power from 1980 to 1983, achieved stabilization because 
it was able to put an end to economic failures, fight inflation, overcome political anarchy 
and civil disorder, and restore confidence in the financial credibility of Turkey. (Ancanlı 
and Rodrik, 1990).
At the beginning of 80s, the introduction of new economic strategies by the IMF and the 
World Bank to promote export and to develop a free market required a radical change in 
Turkish development strategy.
After being prime minister in 1983, Turgut Özal emphasized the excessive size and role of 
the state economic enterprises in the nation's economy. His solution was to encourage the 
private sector to achieve its full productive capacity.
Turgut Özal, was labelled as Turkey's economic czar and became famous as a believer in 
the private sector's ability to stimulate economic growth. Since Özal's government had to 
consolidate a broad coalition among groups with conflicting interests, they slowed down 
the pace of privatization and relaxed its fiscal policies.
Leeds (1987) studied the historical background of the SOEs and implementation of the 
privatization program that was initiated in 1983 by the Özal's government and evaluates the 
program between 1983 - 1987 as one of frustration, tension between competing national 
objectives, structural problems of both a political and an economic nature, and 
painstakingly slow process. He also criticizes the Minister Özal and his team by saying:" 
Prime Minister Özal and his team of like-minded technocrats encountered virtually all of 
the obstacles that would be contained in any privatization text book: political and^ 
bureaucratic resistance to change, a suboptimal macroeconomic policy environment and a 
relatively unattractive climate for private investment, controversy over the role of foreign 
advisors, weak and underdeveloped capital markets, inadequate staffing and a lack of 
indigenous technical knowledge of how to implement a privatization strategy, and political
r
uncertainty that undermined public confidence in the future of the program. As a result, 
seven years after the military government designated by Özal the nation's authority on 
economic policy, and four years after he was elected prime minister in his own right, no 
major state-owned enterprise had been privatized."
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One of the World Bank reports (1993) described the situation:" Although Özal had 
committed his government to privatization, he was entering uncharted territory, and one of 
his most difficult problems was the paucity of staff with the expertise to implement the 
program and the resentment of foreign experts and foreign investors."
Shaker (1992) states that, contrary to expectations, export promotion did not lessen state 
intervention; it merely changed its direction. This new direction created significant changes- 
in state policies, which affected the interest groups (industrial, agricultural and private 
sector).
In the sixth five year plan (1990 - 1994), the Turkish government outlined broad economic 
policies, reiterating its emphasis on "privatization as a key instrument in reforming the 
economy."
The current privatization program, as launched by the former Motherland Party 
government in 1986 and approved by Demirel's government of 1991 - 1992, is centered on 
the sale of the government's shares in most of the SOEs and the restructuring of the state 
sector in order to prepare it for the sale to the public. It has been described by as " little 
more than a revenue-raising exercise which does not transform the structure and ownership 
of the Turkish industry."
III.2.1 Objectives
Turkish Government has had almost the same objectives with the other developing 
countries which have initiated privatization programs recently. The main objectives can be 
stated as follows:
• To minimize state involvement in the industrial and commercial activities of the 
economy,
• To accelerate further establishment of market mechanisms within the context of liberal 
economic policies,
• To confine the role of the state in the economy to areas like health, basic education, 
social security, national security, large scale infrastructure investments and provide
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suitable legal and structural environment for free enterprise to operate,
• To enhance the competition in the economy,
• To decrease iht financial burden of the State Economic Enterprises on the national 
budget,
• To broaden and deepen the existing capital market by promoting wider share 
ownership,
• To provide efficient allocation of resources,
• To transfer privatization revenues to the major infrastructure projects.
III.3 Steps Taken for Privatization
This section explains the legal and the institutional preparations done in order to achieve 
these objectives.
III.3.1 Legal Preparations
After the privatization program was initiated in 1983, the first two related regulations. Law 
No: 2983 and Law No:3291 were enacted in 1984 and in 1986, respectively. Within the 
perspective of the provisions of Law No: 3291, the Council of Ministers was authorized to 
give decision on the transfer of SOEs to the Public Participation Administration (PPA) and 
the High Planning Council was authorized to decide on the transfer of partially state owned 
companies and subsidiaries to the PPA for privatization. In 1992, with the Statutory Decree 
No: 473, Public Participation High Council (PPHC) was authorized to approve 
privatization transactions.
Upon formation of a political and social consensus on the needs for privatization, the new 
privatization law has been enacted on November 1994 as the Law No: 4046. Within the 
context of the new law. Public Participation High Council has been replaced with 
Privatization High Council (PHC) which is chaired by Prime Minister and the Public 
Participation Administration has been replaced with Privatization Administration (PA).
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III. 3.2 Institutional Responsibilities
IV. 3.2.1 Privatization High Council (PHC)
PHC is the ultimate decision making body for privatization and is composed of Prime
Minister, Minister of Finance, Minister of Industry and Commerce and two ministers of
State. Its main responsibilities are determined by Law No:4046 as follows:
• Decide on the transfers of State Owned Enteiprises (SOEs), equity participants and 
assets either to the Privatization Administration (PA) or to Undersecretariat of Treasury 
and Foreign Trade (UTFT) for rehabilitation and restructuring prior to privatization,
• Decide to transfer enterprises to other public institutions and local administrations 
when required for national security and public interest,
• Decide to take SOEs out of privatization portfolio if need arises,
• Decide on the method of each privatization for each SOE,
• Decide on downsizing, ceasing or operations, close down or liquidation of companies 
under privatization,
• Approve privatization transactions, evaluate the privatization applications and 
programs, and take the necessary measures against problems,
• Approve budgets of the Privatization Fund (PF) and PA,
• Decide to issue domestic and foreign debt in various forms to be used for Privatization 
Fund,
• Decide on transfers from Privatization Fund to UTFT for necessary expenditures for 
restructuring and rehabilitation of SOEs to be privatized,
• Approve other issues related to the Privatization Fund,
• Decide to buy and sell shares and all commercial papers of SOEs in Privatization 
portfolio.
IV.3.2.2 Privatization Administration (PA)
PA is the executive body for privatization . Its main responsibilities and duties are:
. Advise PHC in matters related to the transfer of SOEs into or out of privatization 
portfolio, and for the need of restructuring and rehabilitation of SOEs,
• Implement decisions of PHC,
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• Direct SOEs to prepare for privatization by,
- Deciding whether SOEs should be converted into joint-stock companies 
and valuing in-kind capital to be contributed by the SOE being converted,
- Determining the capital of SOEs till PA’s shareholding falls below 50%,
- Governing the financial, administrative, legal and technical structures of 
SOEs,
- Deciding on demands from SOEs for obtaining assets, hiring or laying-off 
personnel,
- Proposing Prime Minister nominees for Board of Directors and top 
management appointments,
- Carrying out valuations of the SOEs or part of their assets,
- Giving loans to SOEs,
• Manage Privatization Fund.
III.4 Obstacles in Privatization Process in Turkey
Privatization is not a very easy operation especially in the developing countries like our 
country. During privatization program, there occur lots of obstacles. In SOEs to be 
privatized, there were lots of things to be considered along with the financial and economic 
aspects of the privatization program.
Despite the well-publicized goals of privatization, only 0.5% of fixed assets of the SOEs 
could be sold until 1990 (Privatization Administration Bulletin, 1997). According to a 
World Bank report, only a few sales could be defined as privatization, since the public 
sector is still in control of these companies. As of January, 1997, there are still 55 
companies in the privatization portfolio, 22 of which are 100% government owned.
”In evaluating the Turkish experience of the 1980s, one has to confront the apparent 
paradox of a tremendously successful external adjustment pitted against several internal 
imbalances. While the government launched a round of further trade and foreign exchange 
liberalization in the summer of 1989 to fight inflation, the government alienated all but the 
'rentier groups' and the policies have had scarcely any effect on price stability.” (Rodrik , 
1990)
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Heper and Evin (1993) states that the government has not displayed a consistent sense of 
the purpose and direction. "At times, it is said that the funds raised by the state would be 
recycled into new public investments. This required an overestimation of the value of fixed 
capital to be transferred. At other times, the impression was given that the government 
simply wanted to get rid of the SEEs altogether, for political and financial reasons. This, in 
turn, necessitated an underestimation of the sale value. More recently, macroeconomic 
considerations came to the fore. The inefficient operation of the SEEs is perceived to be 
one of the major stumbling blocks in the efforts to stem inflation."
Oni§ and Riedel (1993) argue that Turkey’s macroeconomic problems were homegrown, 
and successive governments pushed the economy beyond stability because of the political 
imperatives that were closely related to the needs of the broad national coalition. They 
argue that, until the military takeover of September 1980, "too often governments in 
Turkey tried to build a broad coalition by promising the various political constituencies 
more than they could deliver, causing economic instability and, periodically, a crisis."
Those obstacles can be examined according to the subtitles: organization itself, investors, 
pi ivalization operations, political and legal problems.
IIL4.1 Organizational Obstacles:
The studies of several researchers about the subject matter can be summarized under the 
subheadings: overemployment, old technology, management, production and marketing.
• Overemployment: In SOEs , the recruiting was not done according to profitability or 
efficiency, but rather by considering the social and political reasons. After 
privatization, employees should be taken in a very systematic social safety net for 
training and creation of new employment alternatives. That caused an overemployment 
in those companies which resulted in increasing salary costs when compared to the 
private sector personnel costs. On the other hand, seniority compensations of the SOE 
employees that should be paid after privatization were more than the private sector 
seniority compensation, causing extra personnel cost.
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• Old Technology: In most of the SOEs, the technology was very old and thus, causing 
the costs to be very high and the profits very low. These companies needed high 
investments to be more profitable. The need for high investment makes the sale of the 
SOE difficult for the state.
• Financing Problem: Although the transfers were made from the several state 
organizations to the SOEs, by the time, because of the mismanagement, they ran out of 
their financial resources. Thus, they tried to finance from external sources with high 
interest rates. Having high debt/equity ratios makes the privatization for those 
companies more difficult.
• Management: Most of the time, the employees in the management of the SOEs are not 
knowledgeable enough about finance, marketing, sales methods, high technology 
requirements. Besides, top management personnel changes frequently because of the 
political reasons thus causing inconsistency in managerial decisions, lack of strategic 
planning, demotivation among employees. Some of the bureaucrats may resist 
privatization of the companies that are under their supervision because of the fear of the 
risk of losing their power.
• Production and Marketing: State organizations are production-oriented meaning 
marketing divisions are responsible of selling what production divisions produce. They 
do not have any idea of being consumer-oriented. State organizations are very 
powerless in terms of marketing and sales power when compared to the private 
organizations. Selling an organization that is not powerful in either marketing or sales 
is a very difficult task.
III.4.2 Obstacles in Privatization Operations:
• Timing: The timing of the privatization of an SOE is very important because the 
market forces at that time affect the demand for the advertised SOEs. Also, in going to 
public cases, the stock market conditions play an important role.
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• Sales Methods and Comparative Advantages vs. Disadvantages of Those Methods: 
"There is no perfect method for privatization. All have advantages and disadvantages." 
states John Nellis in his seminar at the World Bank in October, 1996. Table 1 shows 
the summary of his presentation in section II. 1. Privatization in Turkey is usually 
achieved by block sale, thus carrying the risk of monopolization / oligopolization.
• Priorities in Privatization: Since there are constraints such as the time to apply the 
privatization plan, financial constraints, social safety net of the employees that are 
working for SOEs, the priorities should be stated beforehand according to the 
objectives of the government.
• Revaluation of the Assets: In order to provide the condition that the assets of the state 
companies are sold at their real value, at the end of each year , they are revalued by the 
Law 2791 since January 21, 1983. The main obstacle here is that usually the 
revaluation rate is below inflation rate causing the company’s assets to be seen less 
valuable than their real value. In 1995, the revaluation rate was 40% while inflation rate 
was 93% which was much more above revaluation rate.
III.4.3 Obstacles with the Investors:
, Insufficiency of Stock Market Intermediaries: In the countries like Turkey where the 
stock market is quite new, the investors have limited services. The citizens living in 
rural areas of the country do not have a direct access to the stock market. Besides, the 
information about the financial data of the firms may not be true.
Shaker (1991) defines the more general problem in privatization in Turkey as weak 
capital markets and a low level of profitability among SOEs. She states: "In other 
words, the enabling environment that can effectuate the transition to a free market 
economy is not available. This seems puzzling, considering the government’s 
enthusiasm to privatize. One major factor that needs to be taken into account is that 
privatization is not merely cosmetic. The process entails societal change as well as 
political and economic changes, and the difficulty is compounded because those who 
stand to gain from new economic policies are a diffuse and unorganized group.
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• Saving Habits of the Investors: Investors may be unwilling to invest their money in 
stock market by rather preferring to invest on gold, foreign exchange, real estate, etc. 
To attract the demand for the privatized companies, special efforts such as advertising, 
publicity are necessary.
111.4.4 Political and Legal Obstacles
in Turkish case, we see a very common feature in the privatization implementations: 
.Political and bureaucratic resistance to change. One component of it is the resistance to 
change that is common for almost every company’s employees. The other component of ' 
the obstacle is the fear of losing some part of political power after the companies are 
privatized.
While the protection creates rents, removing it penalizes not only workers but also certain 
elites who have been receiving rents as a windfall and government officials who see their / 
power disappear with liberalization of the economy. Consequently, observers argue that 
privatization was not perceived as a positive-sum game in Turkey. (Heper, 1990)
Lack of proper laws for privatization procedures from the beginning and the frequent , 
changes in the laws tiuit were effective in the privatization program implementations made 
the implementation slow and inconsistent.
1II.5 The World Bank’.s Technical Assistance Projects for the State Owned 
Enterprises and Privatization in Turkey
The World Bank’s policy on privatization evolved from its experience in assisting member 
countries through structural adjustment and investment operation, economic and sector 
work on the reform of the public enterprise sector, and work related to private sector 
development. The World Bank’s role in the coordinated assistance to the countries with 
International Fiduciary Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) is to provide on how to bring about an enabling environment, laws and regulations 
related to privatization, and the classification of public enterprises in line with the client
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borrower’s objectives. The Bank also gives advise on the design of specific privatization 
programs, including the selection of the enterprises for privatization, development of 
necessary institutions, and the design of regulations governing transactions (World Bank, 
1994).
The World Bank gave loans to Turkish Government in order to assist the privatization 
program. The major projects are as follows:
• Technical Assistance Project For State Economic Enterprises (Loan 2400-TU),
• Privatization Implementation and Social Safety Net Project.
IIL5.1 Technical Assistance Project For State Economic Enterprises (Loan 2400-TU)
The project (Loan 2400-TU) was approved by the Executive Directors in March 1984, and 
was signed three weeks later.
II1.5.1.1 Objectives
The SOE reform decree provided a framework for improving the financial, managerial and 
operational efficiency of the SOEs. However, Government of Turkey recognized that its 
operationalization depended on how readily the SOEs would avail of their new managerial 
autonomy and take steps to change the deep-rooted attitudes of their managers and boards. 
Against this background, the Bank and Turkish Government decided to improve the 
operational efficiency of the selected SOEs. That application would constitute an important 
demonstration effect for the other SOEs. The criteria for the selection of participating 
SOEs were:
• Receptivity of the SOE management to the objectives of technical assistance,
• Ongoing direct or indirect relation between the World Bank and the SOE,
• Possibly the role of the SOE in expending exports.
The project was to complement ongoing Bank efforts to assist some SOEs in their 
rationalization / modernization programs.
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III.5.1.2 Project Components
The loan was given to finance the technical assistance in support of the identified programs 
of three SOEs selected by government as noted below:
• Turkish Coal Corporation ($ 2.95 million) - for improved management information 
system, streamlining of procurement of equipment, spare, training and manpower planning, 
and improvement management of lignite mines;
• Siimerbank (A conglomerate with operations in banking, manufacturing and 
retailing - $ 2.45 million) - for reorganization and rationalization of sales and retail 
organization, improvement of management and data processing systems, feasibility study 
for the rationalization and modernization of Siimerbank's wool textile operations;
• Turkish Railways (TCDD / ADVAS) (One of the three main workshops / 
manuhicturing establishments of Turkish Railways - $ 0.98 million) - for improved cost 
estimation through appropriate breakdown of operations, improvement of operations 
planning and scheduling, including the management information systems to product 
qualily, improving manual inventory management and control through the introduction of 
automated systems, and improved work organization and layout in production and repair 
focilities.
Project also provided funds for the technical assistance for other potential beneficiaries, 
services for consultants and equipment to better define user need, establish standards of 
data accuracy.
The Bank Loan was to be channelled to the SOEs through State Investment Bank (DYB), 
which had previously supported by the Bank.
1II.5.1.3 Project Design and Organization
The project was designed to demonstrate that by fully of the power and flexibility within 
the prevailing Turkish Government rules and procedures, and concurrently seeking
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assistance to enhance their operational efficiency, SOEs could significantly improve their 
overall performance. Whereas the SOEs, particularly those with which the Bank had an 
ongoing relationship, recognized the need for operational improvements, the precise nature 
of the additional changes to be promoted under the project and their scope and timing may 
not have been the subject of a fully participatory discussion within Turkey.
111.5.1.4 Project Implementation
The approval was a year later than the planned date, because of the delay in enacting the 
Decree law. The original date of effectiveness was July 16, 1984, however it was extended 
three times before the Loan become effective in December 1984.
The implementation of the project encountered delays and serious problems from the 
outset, and there was little or no activity pertaining to the three SOEs for several months. 
There were delays in finalizing the consultants’ short lists and letters of invitation, and 
terms of reference for studies.
The Coordination Committee which was suppo.sed to monitor the progress of the project 
and resolve the problems which surfaced proved to be ineffective because it was never 
built up to full strength, replacement were not promptly found for departing members, and 
the fii st chairman was preoccupied with other pressing matters.
111.5.1.5 Project Costs and Financing
The Bank provided a loan of $ 7.6 million over a three year period in order to finance 
technical assistance in support of the identified three SOEs selected by Turkish 
Government.
111.5.1.6 Project Results and Assessment
During the implementation of the project, some components of the project were revised so 
that there was little or no action pertaining to the original project components such as the 
situation in Siimerbank component. However, there was considerable activity involving
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both high level Government personnel and Bank staff directed towards operationalizing the 
philosophy and program of the new Government, particularly with regard to industrial 
restructuring and privatization.
111.5.2 Privatization Implementation and Social Safety Net Project
ni.5.2.1 Objectives
Main objective of the project is to promote efficiency and productivity and the further 
development of Turkey’s dynamic private .sector by providing assistance for an accelerated 
privatization process (World Bank, 1994). The project would also help lay the basis for 
more comprehensive privatization and sustained fiscal contraction in the future. It would 
build up institutional capacity through technical assistance and the experience gained 
through the implementation of the current program, thereby enabling the Government’s 
administrative machinery to manage the larger and more complex workload entailed by a 
broader divestiture program. Another important objective is to alleviate the adverse impact 
of SOE downsizing and divestiture on displaced workers and their families.
111.5.2.2 Project Description 
The project would include:
• Technical and financial support for the preparation and implementation of 
privatization transactions; a public information campaign to promote and broaden public 
support for the Government’s privatization agenda; the strengthening of PA; and the 
strengthening of the capacity of the Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade to 
manage the debt liabilities of SOEs to be privatized,
• Social safety net measures, including labour adjustment programs to determine the 
extent of labour displacement in individual SOEs, assess the demand for labour services, 
and provide counselling, retraining, and small business assistance through local 
institutions; the strengthening of agencies responsible for the labour adjustment programs; 
and studies to analyze the options for the reform of the social insurance / pension systems,
• The preparation of a regional development plan to diversify the economic base of 
the Zonguldak region, where a high concentration of layoffs in steel and mining operations
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is likely,
• Studies to develop a regulatory framework for the privatization of the 
telecommunications sector and establish a coordinated strategy for the private provision of 
inlrastructure services.
III.5.2.3 Project Costs and Financing
Total project costs were planned to be $ 129 million. Of the total Bank would finance $ 
100 million and the Government would finance $ 29 million.
III.5.2.4. Project Implementation
PA would be responsible for the implementation of the privatization component, including 
the public information campaign. Treasury would be responsible for managing the SOEs’ 
debt liabilities. The implementing agencies such as Treasury would need technical 
assistance, training, new responsibilities. Contract staff would be u.sed according to the 
workload by the privatization effort.
Treasury would monitor the labour adjustment part with technical assistance. It would also 
act as the channel for directing loan funds to lead agencies which would be responsible for 
delivering the labour adjustment at the local level. The transfer and the use of the funds 
would be in accordance with criteria agreed with the Bank. Treasury would be responsible 
for the studies to be carried out under the project. The State Planning Organization would 
be responsible for the preparation of the Zonguldak regional development plan.
1II.5.2.5 Project Results and Assessment
The project was mainly to assist three SOEs to improve operational and financial 
efficiency, however operational component never worked. Three month after the loan 
approval, the new Government issued a more sweeping decree on privatization and 
restructuring of SOEs than the one existing during loan approval. The utilization of funds 
are agreed to be transferred to the privatization studies precedent to privatization. Although 
studies were well receipt, the Government did not take any action to privatize.
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Privatization implementations started in 1984 with the transfer of incomplete plants of the 
SOEs to the private sector to be completed or to construct a new plant. In this juncture, 6 
plants were sold to different investors and 9 plants were transferred to municipalities or 
state enterprises on book value.
Since 1986, privatization implementations have gained momentum and 114 companies 
were privatized either via sale of shares or asset sale. Among those, no state shares were 
left in 95 companies (Privatization Administration Bulletin, 1997). Appendix 1 has the list 
of the completely privatized companies as of January 1, 1997.
Table 6: Privatization Gross Revenues
III.6 Where We Are Now in Privatization Process
1986-1995
($)
1996
($)
1997
f$)
TOTAL
($)
Block Sale 1,274,950,286 217,990,000 173,150,000 1,666,090,286
Asset Sale 203,539,351 71,765,349 380,012 275,684,712
Public Offering 433,197,263 0 0 433,197,263
Inlei national Offering 330,000,000 0 0 330,000,000
l.S.B. Sale 522,453,459 1,988,800 0 524,442,259
Incomplete Asset Sale 2,139,819 0 0 2,139,819
TOTAL 2,766,280,178 291,744,149 173,530,012 3,231,554,339
Source: Privatization Administration Bulletin, May 14, 1997
Since 1985, total sales of privatization implementations has been about $ 3.2 billion as 
seen In Table 6. Some of these asset and share sales were made on installment 
compensation and foreign exchange basis. As of May 14, 1997, $ 2.8 billion net 
privatization revenue have been realized. The discrepancy between sales value and net
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revenues derives from interest on compensation by instalments and exchange rate 
variations in case of foreign exchange compensations.
Total income from organizations on the privatization program during the 1985-1997 
period, including $ 1 billion dividend income reached to $ 4.2 billion as seen in Table 7.
Table 7: Cash Proceeds of Privatization
1986-1994 1995 1996 TOTAL
($) ($) ($) 1$)
PRIVATIZATION REVENUES 2,123,534,920 440,254,934 221,949,035 2,785,520,404
_ Block Sale 872,871,069 264,815,854 168,128,778 1,305,815,701
_ Asset Sale 5,867,485 155,731,365 51,831,666 213,430,516
_ Public Offering 424,526,549 0 0 424,526,549
_ International Offering 316,305,000 0 0 316,305,000
_ I.S.E. Sale 502,410,599 19,697,504 1,988,591 524,096,694
_ Incomplete Asset Sale 1,554,218 10,211 0 1,345,944
DIVIDEND INCOME 671,883,268 72,083,857 306,228,324 1,050,195,449
ISSUED PRIVATIZATION BILLS 0 24,142,396 0 24,142,396
PRINCIPAL PAYMENTS 0 12,940,505 6,692,285 19,145,148
EXT. LOAN AND GRANT 0 255,069,501 3,776,110 258,845,611
OTHER 7,912,031 30,517,994 31,498,738 69,928,763
TOTAL 2,803,330,219 835,009,187 570,144,492 4,208,265,413
.Source: Privatization Administration Bulletin, May 14, 1997
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Table 8; Privatization Expenditures (1986 -1996)
1986-1994
f$)
1995
($)
1996
($)
TOTAL
($)
278,766,588 9,521,421 8,478,330 291,368,030
23,422,392 10,812,968 3,358,871 37,546,293
23,987,764 5,748,225 2,990,624 31,462,992
1,704,440,340 141,684,632 180,026,631 2,004,065,306
134,243,223 0 0 134,243,223
404,117,168 402,856,193 354,669,411 1,157,355,489
693,858 27,944,279 32,468,778 57,380,554
0 82,238,905 53,260,695 157,955,504
0 28,982,665 6,867,964 34,143,483
22,193,831 7,718,236 4,180,826 33,428,764
2,591,865,164 717,507,524 646,302,130 3,938,949,638
Transt'er to the Companies
Consulting
Public Relations
Capital Increase
l.S.E. Purchases
Transfers to the Treasury
Social Assistance Supplements
Credits to The Companies
Loan Compensations
Others
TOTAL
Table 9: Privatization Implementations By Years (1985-1996)
Years Sales (Million $)
1985-88 29.6
1989 131.2
1990 486.3
1991 223.6
1992 422.9
1993 545.5
1994 411.8
1995 515.4
1996 291.7
1997 173.5
TOTAL 3,231.5
Source: Privatization Administration Bulletin, May 14, 1997
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In 1985 - 1997 period, total privatization expenses were $ 3.9 billion. The largest item in 
privatization expenditures (about 60 %) was financing in the form of equity participants 
and loans as seen in Table 8. Table 9 shows the privatization implementations by years 
(1985 - 1997).
In January 1997, the negotiations for 21 companies to sell were completed by Privatization 
Administration. Now, they are waiting for the approval of Privatization High Council 
before meeting with IMF. The total sales amount is expected to be $ 580 million. 
Appendix 2 shows the names of those companies and their sales amount.
Also, Etibank is sold in January 20, 1997 to Doğan Textile at amount of $185 million 
while Anadolubank is sold to Mehmet Rüştü Başaran at $ 69.5 million ( January 23, 1997) 
and Denizbank is sold to Zorlu Holding at $ 66 million (January 24, 1997). Those three 
companies are also waiting for the completion of the technical preparations before the 
approval of PHC.
TTT.7 Planned Future Privatizations
Since 1985, a total of 159 companies have been taken into the privatization portfolio. Some 
of these are Rilly state owned enterprises, while others have more than 50% state shares. 
Later, nine of the companies that were planned to be privatized were taken out for various 
reasons.
For 1997, the coalition government has an ambitious revenue targets form privatization. 
Erbakan stated that Turkey aims to have a balanced budget and to raise at least $ 5.9 billion 
from privatizations in 1997. The World Bank officials told Turkish officials that the 
budgetary drain in this year’s budget, which is expected to give a deficit of TL 1,300 
trillion, would become worse unless substantial corrective measures are taken on social 
security and privatization.
Currently, there are 55 companies and some real estates in the portfolio for 1997. Thirty- 
seven of those companies have more than 50% state shares. (See Appendix 3.)
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From the beginning of privatization program which started in mid 80s, 114 companies 
were privatized and more than $ 3 billion of revenue was got. There are still remaining 55 
companies in the privatization portfolio. The expected sales for the year 1997 is almost $ 
5.9 billion.
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IV. MEASURE OF PERFORMANCE OF PRIVATIZATION
Testing the performance of the privatization is a critical issue to see the impact of the 
privatization programs of the governments. However, most of the time, testing is not that 
easy. This section analyzes the studies performed in the world and in Turkey.
IV. 1 Performance Analysis in the World
The British privatization program has raised tens of billions of pounds for the Treasury, has 
created millions of new shareholders, and significantly reduced state involvement in 
enterprise decision making in a number of industries. However, its impact on economic 
efficiency is rather less clear. (Bishop and Kay, 1988)
Megginson, Nash, Randenborgh (1994) tested the performance of 61 privatized companies 
from 18 countries in terms of efficiency, investment, profitability, production by using the 
data of the privatized companies three years before and after privatization. They tried to 
measure and compare the pre- and post-privatization performances of the companies in 
different subsets. In fifth part of this study, performance analysis of the privatization 
program in the cement industry is performed and their study is taken as a base.
In their study, ’return on sales’, ’return on capital’, ’return on assets’ ratios are used to 
measure the profitability. They find that there are problems with assets and capital in 
terms of revaluation. According to the research done with those profitability ratios, 70 % of 
the firms worldwide had improved profit margins after privatization. The increase in the 
profits are most of the time explained by the increase in the prices.
They used ’inflation adjusted sales/number of employees’ and ’inflation adjusted net
37
income/number of employees’ ratios to measure efficiency. The reseai'ch result showed 
that the efficiency increased in satisfactory amounts after privatization. However, they 
admit that the data they had were not enough to determine the reasons of the performance 
improvement after privatization. Total employment level and output per employee decrease 
while leverage has no significant improvement after privatization.
“Yarrow (1990) tested the hypothesis: ' Privatization increases the efficiency and the 
profitability' for the period 1981 - 1986. He could not find any direct relationship between 
privatization and efficiency and/or profitability, but arrived at a conclusion that 
privatization in Great Britain caused the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement to 
decrease.” (Karataş, 1990)
The performance of the privatization in Great Britain is also studied by M. Bishop and J. 
Kay (1989). Their study shows that the main reason of the increase in the productivity is 
the decrease in the labour force.
IV.2 Performance Analysis in Turkey
In Turkey, Çakmak and Zaim (1992) used a stochastic frontier approach to analyze the 
relative technical inefficiency differences among the private, public and mixed enterprises 
in the Turkish cement industry. The results indicate that in terms of static inefficiency, the 
ownership type does not affect the performance in terms of technical efficiency of the 
enterprises. It was not possible to reject the hypothesis that if there is little competition in 
the product market, the pressures of the marketplace affect the private managers no more 
than the public managers. Therefore, at least in cement industry, government policies more 
oriented to promote competition with or without ownership transfer might generate 
substantial improvements in productive efficiency.
Karataş (1993) made a study on Teletaş, Ankara , Afyon, Balıkesir, Söke Cement 
companies to measure the labour productivity and sales profitability after privatization 
concluding increase in the labour productivity mainly because of the significant decrease in 
the employment levels.
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Suigmez (1995) made a limited study to measure the performance of the five first 
privatized cement companies between 1985 - 1992. He used 'return on sales' ratio to 
measure profitability and 'labour productivity' to measure productivity. He concluded that 
the decrease in the number of the employees was in large amounts for the cement industry. 
While this had a positive impact on the company, the impact of it on the national economy 
and social problems should be studied separately. Cement companies maintained almost 
the same amount of production with less labour force. This caused the labour productivity 
to increase after privatization. The improvement in the productivity is not accompanied 
with the improvement in the profitability. Some of the companies had negative profitability 
figures for a few years.
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V. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS
This pait oi the study compares the financial and operating performance of six cement 
companies in pre- and post-privatization periods. Five of them (Ankara, Afyon, Balıkesir, 
Söke, Trakya) are the first privatized cement companies of Turkey in 1989. The sixth one, 
Niğde was privatized in 1991. While Ankara, Balıkesir, Söke and Trakya were privatized 
by block sale, Niğde and Afyon were privatized by both block sale and public offering.
Since all of the companies, but two, in cement industry are privatized, cement industry is 
chosen for the performance analysis. In this part, first, background and structure of the 
cement industry are examined. Brief information is given about the companies in cement 
industry. Those companies are chosen for the analysis because they are the six first 
privatized cement companies, thus allowing us as many as post-privatization years for the 
analysis. The more the years to analyze, the more reliable becomes the analysis. Besides, 
those companies are approximately hundred percent owned by the state before 
privatization. Thus the difference between being state owned and being privately owned 
becomes more apparent. Data, hypothesis, methodology and findings are the remaining 
sections.
V.l Background and Structure of Cement Industry in Turkey
Cement is produced in Turkey since 1912. There are 41 cement companies only 2 of which 
are now in public hands in Turkey. Privatized cement companies are listed in Appendix 4 
by privatization type.
Almost all of the cement plants were built during the import substitution era. As is the case 
for most of the industries in most developing countries, the cement industry in Turkey
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enjoyed the benefits of tariff protection until 1984, when there was a significant shift 
towards the liberalization of foreign trade. In 1983, nominal and effective protection rates 
were 58% and 44.4% respectively. (Togan and Olgun, 1991)
In 1992, Turkey was producing 5.56 % of the world cement production which was a 
significant amount as seen in Table 10. At that point, the efficiency of the cement plants 
has become more important in order to be competitive in the world arena.
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Table 10: Cement Industry in Western Europe and Turkey in 1992
COUNTRY
Cement 
Production 
(1,000 tons)
Imports 
(1,000 tons)
Exports 
(1,000 tons)
Cement 
Consumption 
(1,000 tons)
Austria 5,030 240 28 5,218
Belgium 7,933 400 2,300 2185,750
Denmark 1,791, 223 793 1,241
Finland 1,083 100 - 1,191
France 22,641 1,665 2,435 21,538
Germany 33,226 6,000 2,300 35,939
Great Britain 13,620 - 6,006 7,613
Greece 100 - - 104
Iceland 1,480 260 300 1,450
Ireland 41,500 3,600 200 44,470
Italy 1,300 - 860 480
Luxembourg 3,100 3,200 710 5,250
Holland 1,300 50 150 1,210
Norway 1,638 - 38 7,580
Portugal 24,756 3,180 1,977 25,796
Spain 1,850 100 200 800
Sweden 4,284 366 51 4,250
Switzerland 30,194 398 4,417 25,965
Turkey 11,600 7,500 400 12,540
TOTAL 208,426 27,282 23,165 209,385
Turkey’s Share (%) 5.56 % 27.49 % 1.72% 5.98 %
Source: Türkiye Çimento ve Toprak Sanayi A.Ş., (1992), Annual Report
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Cement manufacturers have an association called Turkish Cement Manufacturers 
Association. The Association had the right to determine the prices between 1981 - 1985 
subject to the approval of the government. In 1986, the government control over the 
cement price was lilted. When we consider the decision power of the association and the 
tarilt lor the cement industry, it can be said that the cement industry is not highly 
competitive.
Up to now, 26 cement companies that were belonging to the state had been privatized (See 
Appendix 1). As of January, 1997, there are 2 cement companies in the privatization 
portfolio. (Ergani Çimento Sanayi Tic. A.Ş. and Kurtalan Çimento Sanayi Tic. A.Ş.) (See 
Appendix 3)
Figure 1: Breakdown of the Sales Methods in Privatization in Cement Industry
BFEAKDOVVN OF TIE IVETHDIb IN IN СЕШуЛ-IhDUSmy
Bock9ale+Plb 
PUolicOff. Off
5%
Bock Sale 
88%
■ Bock Sale 
1РШю Offering 
IBockSale+PlbOff.
Figure I gives the breakdown of the privatization methods in cement industry. Up to now, 
7% of the cement companies were privatized by public offering, 88% of them were 
privatized by block sale, and the remaining 5% of the cement companies were privatized 
by both public offering and block sale.
43
Privatization in cement industry started in 1989. Between 1989 and 1996, 26 cement 
companies have been privatized. Afyon, Ankara, Balıkesir, Söke, Trakya cement 
companies which had been operating related to Türkiye Çimento ve Toprak Sanayi A.Ş. 
were taken in the privatization portfolio by Mass Housing and State Partnership in April 
30, 1987, and privatized during 1989.
In October, 1988, Société Cement Français (SCF) bought those five by giving the best 
offer at the block sale auction.. SCF signed an agreement with High Planning Council in 
September, 1989. The points of the agreement are as follows:
• At least 40% of the shares of each of the five will be offered to the public.
• Against monopoly, the shares belonging to SCF will be sold to cement producers and 
SCF will not buy any shares from the existing cement firms.
• SCF will guarantee the seniority compensations and the other rights of the personnel.
• SCF will invest $ 60 - 70 million in those five in the coming 5 years.
Niğde Çimento which was founded in 1957 was privatized in 1991 by block sale and in 
1992 by public offering. The shares sold by block sale was bought by Oyak -  Ömer 
Sabancı.
Those six companies in the analysis are important in a sense that they are the first 
privatized cement companies, thus allowing the analysis’ time span to be as large as 
possible. On the other hand, their shares sold separately are almost 100% which means 
that public share is almost nonexisting after privatization.
For some of the other cement companies like Mardin, Ünye, Adana which were privatized, 
government just sold part of its dividend share without having any decision making power 
in terms of management or production. Thus including such companies in the analysis 
would not make sense.
V.2 Information About the Six Cement Companies in the Analysis
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V.3 Data
The analysis is limited to the companies that are the first privatized six cement companies 
by block sale namely Ankara, Afyon, Balıkesir, Niğde, Söke, Trakya. This provides the 
advantage ol measuring the pre- and post-performance of as many as years as possible.
In this study, a sample of the six for at least 5 years of pre- and post-privatization 
accounting data is collected. Since Ankara, Afyon, Balıkesir, Söke and Trakya were 
privatized in 1989, it was possible to make the analysis on 7 years of pre- and post­
privatization data. Pre-privatization years in the analysis are from 1982 to 1988 and post­
privatization years are from 1990 to 1996. Niğde was privatized in 1991, thus allowing an 
analysis of 5 years for pre- (between years 1986 and 1990) and post-privatization (between 
years 1992 and 1996).
Local currency data are employed to compute the ratios using nominal data in both the 
numerator and denominator. In computing real sales efficiency, the sales revenue data are 
deflated by using consumer price index (CPI) values taken from the Government Statistics 
Institute. For the sales efficiency (SALEFF) and net income efficiency (NIEFF) figures, 
sales and net income values are deflated by the mid-year dollar exchange rate values to get 
rid of the effects of inflation.
V.4 Hypothesis
The expectations from a privatization program are that privatization will:
1) Increase the firm’s profitability,
2) Increase its operating efficiency,
3) Increase its output,
4) Lower the employment levels,
5) Decrease the leverage.
The hypotheses are based on the measurement of whether there is a significant change 
between the pre- and post-privatization means and medians of the companies one by one 
and on the overall according to performance measures. The performance measures are as
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follows:
• Profitability (In terms of return on sales, return on assets and return on equity)
• Operating Efficiency (In terms of sales efficiency and net income efficiency)
• Output (In terms of real sales)
• Employment (In terms of total employment)
• Leverage (In terms of debt to assets and long-term debt to equity)
T-test is used to test (he significance of change between the pre- and post-privatization 
means for each company. For the overall analysis, Wilcoxon signed rank test and t-test are 
used to test whether there is a significant change in the pre- and post-privatization means of 
the six on the overall while Wilcoxon rank test is used to measure the overall performance 
according to the medians. The findings are discussed in the order of the performance 
measures stated above.
The goals stated above are tested to see whether they are achieved after privatization of the 
six cement companies. The testable hypothesis are listed in Table 11.
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Table 11: Summary of Hypothesis about Performance of Privatized Companies
Characteristics Performance Measures Expected Outcome
(Alternative
Hypothesis)
Profitability Return on Sales (ROS) = Net Income/Sales ROS, > ROS,,
Return on Assets tROA) = Net income / Total Assets ROA, > ROAb
Return on Equity (ROE) = Net income / Equity ROE, > ROE,,
Operating
Efficiency
Sales Efficiency (SALEFF) = Sales / Number of
Employees
Net Income Efficiency (NIEFF) = Net Income/
Number of Employees
SALEFF, >SALEFFb 
NIEFF, > NIEFF,,
Output Real Sales (SAL) =Nominal Sales / Consumer Price
Index
SAL, > SAL,,
Fiinployment Total Employment (EMPL) = Total Number of
Employees
EMPL, < EMPLb
Leverage Debt to Assets (LEV) = Total Debt / Total Assets LEV, < LEV,,
Long-Term Debt to Equity (LEV2) = Long-Term Debt /
Equity
LEV2, < LEV2,,
‘a’ : Post-privatization value 
‘b’ : Pre-privatization value
This table details the economic characteristics that are examined for changes resulting from 
privatization. The expected (alternative) hypothesis are presented and defined. The 
predicted changes in the economic characteristics after privatization are based on the 
avowed objectives of the governments launching privatization program and the theoretical 
works cited in the text above. The index symbols in the predicted relationship column
47
stand tor after privatization and before privatization, respectively. Profitability, operating 
etticiency and output are expected to increase after privatization. Post-privatization values 
ot employment and leverage are expected to be lower than the pre-privatization values.
V.5 Methodology
The average and median of each variable for each firm over the pre- and post-privatization 
windows (pre-privatization; years -7 to -1 for Ankara, Afyon, Balıkesir, Söke, Trakya, 
years -5 to -1 for Niğde, and post-privatization; years -i-l to +7 for Ankara, Afyon, 
Balıkesir, Söke, Trakya, years -t-1 to +5 for Niğde) are calculated. For all firms, the year of 
privatization (year 0) includes both the public and private ownership of the enterprise. 
Therefiire, year 0 is excluded from calculations.
T-test is used to test whether there is significant improvement in the means of each 
company comparing pre- and post-privatization periods. In order to test the difference 
between the means of the pre- and post-privatization values of the companies on the 
overall, both t-test and Wilcoxon signed rank test are used. Wilcoxon rank test is employed 
to measure the significance of the difference between the medians on the overall. Table 12 
summarizes the methodology used for each criterion.
Table 12; The Methodology Used to Measure the Performance of the Companies
Mean Median
Each Company Separately T-test
All Companies on the Overall Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test 
T-test
Wilcoxon Rank Test
V.5.1 T-test
Having computed pre- and post-privatization averages, t-test for two population means is 
used to investigate the significance of the difference between the means of pre- and post­
privatization parameters of each company and all companies on the overall. The test
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statistic is
T = (Xa-Xb)/aSa“ + Sh-)/n)"·'
Where n is the equal number of observation before and after privatization, ‘n’ equals 7 for 
Ankara, Afyon, Balıkesir, Söke and Trakya and equals 5 for Niğde. The degrees of 
freedom (df) is computed as follows;
df = { [((Sa^  + Sb“) / n )"] / [ ((Sa'" + Sb^ ) / n) / (n“*(n +1)) ] }-24 . c  4x
If T > T ,,ai,ai with the calculated degrees of freedom, then reject H„. This test is valid for 
the characteristics where Ha: |da > M-i)
V.5.2 Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test
This test is employed to measure the significance of the difference of the means. The 
computational sequence for this test for Ha.· jda > jLlb is as follows:
• Calculate averages of pre- and post-privatization values,
• Calculate the difference between averages,
• Assign ranks to each difference in ascending order without regard to sign by ignoring 
zero values,
• Add sign of the difference scores to the ranks,
• Sum the ranks for negative difference scores, {T-}.
• If {T-}=< T„i,¡cal, then reject H„.
V.5.3 Wilcoxon Rank Test
This test is employed to measure the significance of the difference of the medians. The 
computational sequence for this test for Ha: jia > |Tb is as follows;
• Calculate the medians of the pre- and post-privatizations values of each company,
• Assign ranks to each median in ascending order without regard to being pre- or post­
privatization value,
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• Determine W „ by summing the ranks of medians for after privatization values,
• If P(W,) = < a  (level of significanee), then reject Ho.
V.6 Findings
Findings are examined in terms of the five criteria stated above namely profitability, 
operating efficiency, output, employment and leverage.
V.6.1 Profitability
In this study, profitability is measured using three ratios: Return on Sales (ROS), Return on 
Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). The profitability ratios are expected to 
increase. The results for profitability ratios are seen in Tables 13-15.
All the test outcomes, contrary to the expectations, are resulted in the failure to reject null 
hypothesis. That means that there is no significant improvement in any of the companies or 
on the overall in terms of profitability.
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Table 13: RETURN ON SALES (ROS) = Net I n c o m e /Sales
Before Privatization Years
Year -7 Year -6 Year -5 Year -4 Year -3 Year -2 Year -1
Average
Xb
Standard 
Dev. SbANKARA -0.2315 -0.2201 0.0167 0.0933 0.0786 0.1537 0.0069 -0.0146 0.1524AFYON -0.0513 0.0073 0.0686 0.1273 0.2259 0.2628 0.1985 0.1199 0.1173BALIKESİR 0.1129 0.1820 0.3635 0.2907 0.4001 0.3266 0.3155 0.2845 0.1019NİĞDE 0.2311 0.2870 0.3250 0.0826 0.0641 0.1979 0.1187SOKE -0.0717 0.0190 0.1051 0.2212 0.2457 0.1611 0.2196 0.1286 0.1186TRAKYA -0.4101 -0.0688 0.3269 0.1991 0.2851 0.3035 0.2590 0.1278 0.2725
0.1407 0.1758
After Privatizati on Years
Year -1-1 Year +2 Year +3 Year +4 Year
+5
Year -1-6 Year +7
Average
Xa
Standard 
Dev. Sa
ANKARA -0.1875 0.0172 0.0406 0.0296 -0.4652 -0.4525 -0.3560 -0.1963 0.2296AFYON 0.1109 0.0309 -0.0074 0.0457 0.0301 -0.0197 0.0324 0.0318 0.0421BALIKESİR -0.0009 0.0356 -0.0502 0.0046 0.1270 0.0027 -0.0233 0.0136 0.0565NİĞDE 0.1308 0.2600 0.2494 0.1190 0.2033 0.1925 0.0654SOKE 0.0898 0.1202 -0.0109 0.0095 0.0965 0.1465 0.0858 0.0768 0.0572TRAKYA 0.0308 0.0341 -0.1291 -0.2543 -0.0005 -0.1201 0.0115 -0.0611 0.1095
0.0096 0.1590
ANKARA
1 "O tS tlS tlC  
for Means
-1 74'^R
Degrees 
of Freedom
11 Q1
Critical 
T-value 
at a=.05
i T Q O
Result Sum of 
Ranks
Wa
Sum of 
Ranks
Wb
Critical 
Value 
at a=.05
Wilcoxon Test Result 
for the Medians
Difference
Between
Means
Rank Wilcoxon Test Result 
for the Means 
at a=.05
AFYON
1 . / ^ O O
-1.8689
I I I
8.03 1.860
Fail to reject Ho 
Fail to reject Ho
26 52 1 Fail to reject Hq
-0.1816
-0.0880
-0.2708
-0.0054
-0.0518
-0.1889
/ T.\
-4
-3
-6
-1
-2
-5
O i
Fail to reject Hq
BALIKESİR -6.1477 10.50 1.796 Fail to reject Hq
NİĞDE -0.0899 7.34 1.895 Fail to reject Ho
SÖKE -1.0409 9.53 1.812 Fail to reject Ho
TRAKYA
OVERALL
-1.7018
-3.4983
8.52
79.18
1.833
1.645
Fail to reject Ho 
Fail to reject Ho
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Table 14: RETURN ON ASSETS (ROA) = Net Income / Total Assets
Before Privatization Years
Year -7 Year -6 Year -5 Year -4 Year -3 Year -2 Year -1
Average
Xb
Standard 
Dev. Sb
ANKARA -0.4727 -0.3939 0.0317 0.8663 0.1591 0.2167 0.0109 0.0597 0.4430
AFYON -0.1757 0.0247 0.1857 0.5533 0.5449 0.5881 0.5347 0.3222 0.3093BALIKESİR 0.2122 0.2536 0.5103 0.4126 5.3484 0.4756 0.0479 1.0372 1.9080NİĞDE 0.4095 0.4805  ^ 0.4484 ^  0.1113 0.0883 0.3076 0.1915SÖKE -0.2291 0.0597 0.2789 0.6498 0.5205 0.5017 0.5670 0.3355 0.3195TRAKY A -0.7078 -0.0941 0.4401 0.3832 0.5644 0.5535 0.5599 0.2427 0.4789
0.3842 0.8721
After Privatization Years
Year +1 Year +2 Year -t-3 Year
+4
Year +5 Year +6 Year +7
Average
Xa
Standard 
Dev. Sa
ANKARA -0.3042 0.0365 0.0257 0.0124 -0.1440 -0.1287 -0.1459 -0.0926 0.1247
AFYON 0.2985 0.0695 -0.0206 0.0927 0.0492 -0.0433 0.0804 0.0752 0.1112
BALIKESİR -0.0024 0.0567 -0.0703 0.0071 0.1491 0.0032 -0.0230 0.0172 0.0694
NİĞDE 0.1988 0.3322 0.3132 0.1652 0.2432 0.2505 0.0718
SÖKE 0.1408 0.2351 -0.0133 0.0154 0.1251 0.2181 0.0473 0.1098 0.0971
TRAKYA 0.0429 0.0373 -0.1071 -0.2189 -0.0004 -0.0780 0.0103 -0.0448 0.0955
0.0525 0.1405
A ÜI 1/ A n A
T-Statistic 
for Means
Degrees 
of Freedom
Critical 
T-value 
at a=.05
Result Sum of 
Ranks
Wa
Sum of 
Ranks
Wb
Critical 
Value 
at a=.05
Wilcoxon Test Result 
for the Medians
Difference
Between
Means
Rank Wilcoxon Test Result 
for the Means 
at oc=.05ANKARA -0.8758 7.26 1.895 Fail to reject Ho
24 54 1 Fail to reject Ho
-0.1523 
-0.2470 
-1.0200 
-0.0571 
-0.2257 
-0.2876
-2
-4
-6
-1
-3
-5
Fail to reject Ho
AFYON -1.9887 8.03 1.896 Fail to reject Ho
BALIKESİR -1.4135 6.02 1.944 Fail to reject Ho
NİĞDE -0.6243 5.65 1.943 Fail to reject Ho
SÖKE -1.7885 7.47 1.860 Fail to reject Ho
TRAKYA -1.5581 6.64 1.895 Fail to reject Ho
OVERALL -2.3744 41.13 1.645 Fail to reject Ho {T-} 21
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TabiG 15; RETURN ON EQUITY (ROE) = NgI Income / Equity
ANKARA
AFYON
BALIKESİR
NİĞDE
SOKE
TRAKYA
Before Privatization Years
Year -7 Year -6 Year -5 Year -4 Year -3 Year -2 Year -1
Average
Xb
Standard 
Dev. Sb
ANKARA 0.5356 0.4260 -0.0596 -4.6806 0.7603 0.8836 0.0525 -0.2975 1.9631
AFYON 1.0611 -3.1667 1.2562 1.1937 1.0810 1.2138 1.0089 0.5211 1.6287
BALIKESİR 0.6906 0.3695 0.5866 0.5802 0.8242 0.7593 0.7548 0.6521 0.1541
NİĞDE 0.6200 0.7921 0.9014 0.2954 0.2975 0.5813 0.2787
SÖKE 1.7143 0.6111 1 .0 0 0 0 1.3006 0.8955 1.0109 1.0816 1.0877 0.3454
TRAKYA 0.7589 -0.2490 1.0898 0.5517 0.9272 0.9314 0.9642 0.7106 0.4568
0.5426 1.1183
After Pri vatizatio n Years
Year +1
-11.6116
0.6084
-0.0073
0.4677
0.4264
0.1597
Year +2
0.0943
0.2777
0.1777
0.5509
0.5404
0.1782
Year -1-3
0.0477
-1.0515
-0.2307
0.5096
-0.0517
-0.4893
Year +4
0.0371
0.2763
0.0172
0.2516
0.0387
-1.4811
Year -1-5
-0.4806
0.1793
0.2993
0.3537
0.2086
-0.0009
Year -f6
-0.3107
-1.0655
0.0065
0.3074
-0.1462
Year +7
-0.3672
0.1932
-0.0578
0.1682
0.0143
Average
X.
-1.7987
-0.0832
0.0293
0.4267
0.2340
-0.2522
-0.2407
Standard 
Dev. Sa
4.3331
0.6814
0.1694
0.1224
0.2086
0.5869
1.8909
T-Statistic 
for Means
Degrees 
of Freedom
Critical 
T-value 
at q=.05 
1.883
Result Sum of 
Ranks
Wa
Sum of 
Ranks
Wb
Critical 
Value 
at a=.05
Wilcoxon Test Result 
for the Medians
Difference
Between
Means
Rank
-1.5012 -6
2 2
-0.6043 -2
56 1 Fail to reject Hp -0.6229 -3
-0.1546 -1
-0.8537 -4
-0.9628 -5
{T-} 21
Wilcoxon Test Result 
for the Means 
at a=.05-0.8349 9.15
AFYON
Fail to reject Ho
-0.9056 8.72 1.883
BALIKESİR
Fail to reject Ho
-7.1968 13.86 1.761
NIGDE
Fail to reject Ho
-1.1356 6.23 1.943
SOKE
Fail to reject Ho Fail to reject Ho
-5.5984 11.15 1.796
TRAKYA
OVERALL
Fail to reject Ho
-3.4250
-2.3744
13.09
41.13
1.771
1.645
Fail to reject Hp 
Fail to reject Hp
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V.6.2 Operating Efficiency
Governments expect firms to employ their human, financial and technical resources more 
efficiently after privatization. This is crucial for both the employees of the company and 
the shareholders. Inflation adjusted (adjustment is done by finding the dollar values of the 
sales and net income) sales and net income are employed for those ratios. Although it is 
unfavourable for the governments to face the decreasing employment levels, this is almost 
inevitable. Partly because of that decline in the employment levels, sales and net income 
efficiency figures are expected to increase. Tables 16-17 show the figures for efficiency.
• Sales Efficiency (SALEFF): The t-test results do not indicate significant improvements 
for each company. On the overall, the means .seem to differ significantly after 
privatization according to the conclusion drawn from t-test for two means, Wilcoxon 
signed rank test for two means and Wilcoxon rank test for two medians. On the overall, 
sales per employees working in the company have been increased.
• Net Income Efficiency (NIEFF): Tests other than the t-test for Söke result in the failure 
to reject the null hypothesis. Thus, one can conclude that the companies other than 
Söke do not show some significant improvement in terms of net income/ number of 
employees ratio. The overall picture got by t-test and Wilcoxon tests are consistent 
with the each other, thus we can conclude that there is no significant increase in the net 
income per employee.
V.6.3 Output
There are conflicting di.scussions about the predicted result of the output change after 
privatization as stated above. Some economists argue that government can expect an 
increase in real sales because of better incentives, more flexible financing opportunities, 
increased competition, and greater scope for entrepreneurial initiative. On the other hand, 
some researchers expect a decrease in output since the government can no longer entice 
managers (through subsidies) to maintain inefficiently high output levels. In this analysis, 
the output is expected to increase after privatization as stated in Table 11. The figures 
become all inflation adjusted after they are divided by consumer price index (CPI). Table 
18 has the results of real sales.
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Real Sales (SAL): T-test for each company is resulted in failure to reject the null 
hypothesis. That is also consistent with the t-test and Wilcoxon rank test for medians 
that measure the overall performance. On the other hand, Wilcoxon signed rank test for 
means shows that there is a significant improvement in real sales.
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Table 16; SALES EFFICIENCY (SALEFF) = Sales ($) / Number of Employees
Year -7
Before Privatization Years
Year -6 Year -5 Year-4 Year -3 Year -2 Year -1
Average
Xb
Standard 
Dev. Sb
ANKARA
AFYON
BALIKESİR
57722 52676 64211 62008 72438 97583 102443 72726 19645.02786001 37640 44455 41162 46269 53244 65950 42103 18438.375142126 40054 39626 38786 49213 51594 59707 45872 7878.3021
SOKE
TRAKYA
45633 37692 30323 38250 36434 70531 67197 46580 15891.334756381 44203 46736 25069 87317 9225 117331 55180 36758.8672
Mean 1 52492 23372.7249
After Privatization Years
Year +1 Year + 2 Year +3 Year +4 Year +5 Year + 6 Year +7
Average
Xa
Standard 
Dev. Sa
ANKARA 60929 188714 245684 28237 430888 199022 279050 204646 135687.0180
AFYON 103088 131749 176439 228314 260842 101225 126714 161196 62843.3031
BALIKESİR 110860 130585 153782 184916 239660 112476 120119 150343 47401.4258
SÖKE 72090 118770 123969 223677 400731 213073 280515 204689 112615.1685
TRAKYA 115297 152774 223558 261456 402446 155387 199087 215715 95728.3489
Mean a 187318 94390.4544
T-Statistic 
for Means
Degrees 
of Freedom
Critical 
T-value 
at a=.05
Result Sum of 
Ranks
Wa
Sum of 
Ranks 
Wb
Critical 
Value 
at a=.05
Wilcoxon Test Result 
for the Medians
Difference
Between
Means
Rank Wilcoxon Test Result 
for the Means 
at a=.05ANKARA 2.5458 6.34 1.782 Reject Ho 131920.3680 3
AFYON 4.8111 7.37 1.860 Reject Ho 119092.7834 2
BALIKESİR 5.7522 6.44 1.796 Reject Ho 40 15 0.0040 Reject Ho 104470.6500 1 Reject Ho
SÖKE 3.1086 4.24 1.895 Reject Ho 158108.8896 4
TRAKYA 4.1420 8.31 1.812 Reject Ho 160534.6035 5
OVERALL 8.7690 44.01 1.645 Reject Ho {T-} 0
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Table 17: NET INCOME EFFICIENCY (NIEFF) = Net Income ($) / Number of Employees
Before Privatization Years
Year -7 Year -6 Year -5 Year -4 Year -3 Year -2 Year -1
Average
Xb
Standard 
Dev. Sb
ANKARA -13364.86 -11595.85 1068.84 5782.59 5691.28 14994.57 707.69 469.18 10032.0464
AFYON -3063.40 274.53 3043.26 5239.75 10449.25 13982.61 13087.63 6144.81 6555.5596
BALIKESİR 4729.36 7289.57 14382.45 11270.80 19686.09 16840.75 18828.86 13289.70 5755.5371
SÖKE -3256.18 716.08 3180.64 8460.17 8951.90 11357.23 14751.10 6308.71 6336.7450
TRAKYA -22994.67 -3040.52 15253.91 9604.25 24894.42 24901.07 30372.20 11284.38 18858.3691
Mean b 7499.35 11033.2757
After Privatization Years
Year +1 Year + 2 Year +3 Year +4 Year +5 Year -1-6 Year +7
Average
Xa
Standard 
Dev. Sa
ANKARA -11424.66 3238.91 9962.82 8363.55 -200454.07 -90050.88 -99338.61 -54243.28 79449.1889
AFYON 11432.90 4068.29 -1306.20 10430.87 7844.93 -1990.04 4105.73 4940.92 5311.0298
BALIKESİR -104.77 4649.11 -7725.08 849.32 30426.26 305.88 -2793.15 3658.23 12396.2195
SÖKE 6475.70 14273.57 -1350.67 2129.51 38660.27 31222.60 24.08 13062.15 15953.8799
TRAKYA 3552.17 5212.55 -28850.48 -66491.83 -206.74 -18667.37 2294.22 -14736.78 26226.1623
Mean -9463.75 43743.5925
T-Statistic 
for Means
Degrees 
of Freedom
Critical
T-value
Result Sum of 
Ranks
Sum of 
Ranks
Critical
Value
Wilcoxon Test 
Result
Difference
Between
Rank Wilcoxon Test Result 
for the Meansat a=.05 Wa Wb at a=.05 for the Medians Means at a=.05ANKARA -1.8076 6.26 1.943 Fail to reject Ho -54712.4550 5
AFYÖN -0.3775 13.34 1.771 Fail to reject Ho -1203.8815 1
BALIKESİR -1.8645 9.30 1.833 Fail to reject Ho 18 37 0.9841 Fail to reject Ho -9631.4709 3 Fail to reject Ho
SÖKE 0.8797 5.85 1.943 Fail to reject Ho 6753.4446 -2
TRAKYA -2.1313 12.53 1.771 Fail to reject Ho -26021.1653 4
ÖVERALL -2.3781 44.20 1.645 Fail to reject Ho {T-} 2
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Table 18: REAL SALES (SAL) = Nominal Sales / Consumer Price Index
Before Privatization Years
Year -7 Year -6 Year -5 Year -4 Year -3 Year -2 Year -1
Average
Xb
Standard 
Dev. Sb
ANKARA 566.1765 562.5600 633.4052 712.5651 884.7598 926.2371 852.4850 734.0269 153.7625
AFYON 568.9076 416.8000 400.7543 442.6022 535.1739 549.4856 439.5244 479.0354 69.6197
BALIKESİR 394.5378 419.3600 380.6034 435.0929 572.1149 484.7633 427.2708 444.8204 65.1950
NİĞDE 486.1403 430.6159 129.0060 359.0690 385.6040 358.0870 136.8341
SÖKE 281.0924 277.9200 276.9397 302.4535 319.5472 493.2004 342.6093 327.6804 76.9669
TRAKYA 478.9916 428.0000 408.0819 252.4164 932.8548 81.1321 771.2725 478.9642 291.1691
470.4357 196.9017
After Privatization Years
Year +1 Year +2 Year +3 Year +4 Year +5 Year +6 Year +7
Average
Xa
Standard 
Dev. Sa
ANKARA 347.3175 623.2936 663.7217 681.3086 685.9689 689.6346 1582.9365 753.4545 385.5329
AFYON 580.4747 448.4349 489.7742 490.5430 391.5896 350.7565 702.1775 493.3929 118.2693
BALIKESİR 722.5004 447.7652 417.2327 407.9246 357.8142 366.3178 634.1245 479.0970 141.7638
NİĞDE 407.1042 452.8640 446.8904 446.1505 874.0924 525.4203 195.7588
SÖKE 324.4920 290.4669 264.1613 316.1035 353.6868 447.8357 1030.1712 432.4167 269.9947
TRAKYA 697.3175 593.1791 609.3130 660.8823 703.7628 6.2376 1266.4256 648.1597 366.1782
555.3235 277.5476
T-Statistic 
for Means
Degrees 
of Freedom
Critical 
T-value 
at a=.05
Result Sum of 
Ranks 
Wa
Sum of 
Ranks 
Wb
Critical 
Value 
at a=.05
Wilcoxon Test Result 
for the Medians
Difference
Between
Means
Rank Wilcoxon Test Result 
for the Means 
at a=.05
ANKARA 0.1238 8.48 1.782 Fail to reject Ho 19.4275 3
AFYON 0.2768 10.95 1.860 Fail to reject Ho 14.3575 1
BALİ KESİR 0.5812 9.24 1.796 Fail to reject Ho 44 34 0.2424 Fail to reject Ho 34.2766 2 Reject Ho
NİĞDE 1.5666 8.73 1.895 Fail to reject Ho 167.3333 5
SÖKE 0.9870 7.29 1.812 Fail to reject Ho 104.7364 4
TRAKYA 0.9569 13.23 1.833 Fail to reject Ho 169.1955 6
OVERALL 1.5777 71.93 1.645 Fail to reject Ho {T-} 0
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V.6.4 Employment
The decreasing levels in the employment of the companies privatized, due to the desire to 
increase efficiency and profitability , is the great fear of the governments. This is examined 
by the total number of employees. Table 19 shows the findings about employment.
• Total Employment (EMPL): As expected, the employment levels are all increased for 
all the six. The results of all tests are consistent.
V.6.5 Leverage
Leverage ratios are expected to drop after the privatization. The most important reason is 
that the SOEs have extremely high debt levels because most of the equity is available in 
form of capital injections from the government and retained earning. After privatization, 
cost of financing is high for the firms. Tables 20-21 exhibits the results for leverage.
• Debt to Assets (LEV): On the contrary of the expectations, the leverage seems to have 
a significant change after privatization neither for any of the companies nor on the 
overall.
• Long-Term Debt to Equity (LEV2): Same result with debt to assets ratio holds for this 
one. There is no significant change in any of the company’s leverage and on the 
overall after privatization.
There is no significant change in the leverage of the firms after privatization. The 
companies might be financing their investment requirement by debt. They have a 
mandatory amount of money that they have to invest in the first five years of the 
privatization. It is most probably that their debt ratios increase because of financing this 
amount by borrowing.
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Table 19; TOTAL EMPLOYMENT (EMPL) = Total Number of Employees
Before Privatization Years
1 Average StandardYear -7 Year -6 Year -5 Year-4 Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Xb Dev. Sb
ANKARA 426 407 418 420 415 395 457 420 19.2675
AFYON 414 422 382 393 393 431 366 400 23.1620
BALIKESİR 409 399 407 410 395 391 393 401 7.9970
SÖKE 269 281 387 289 298 291 280 299 39.7774
TRAKYA 371 369 370 368 363 366 361 367 3.7161
377 48.1449
After Privatization Years
Year +1 Year +2 Year +3 Year +4 Year +5 Year +6 Year +7
Average
Xa
Standard 
Dev. Sa
ANKARA 328 262 218 210 193 183 173 224 54.3674
AFYON 324 270 224 187 182 183 169 220 57.4962
BALIKESİR 375 272 219 192 181 172 161 225 76.0194
SÖKE 259 194 172 123 107 111 112 154 57.3469
TRAKYA 348 308 220 220 212 212 194 245 58.6044
213 65.5606
T-Statistic 
for Means
Degrees 
of Freedom
Critical 
T-value 
at a=.05
Result Sum of 
Ranks 
Wa
Sum of 
Ranks
Wb
Critical 
Value 
at a=.05
Wilcoxon Test Result 
for the Medians
Difference
Between
Means
Rank Wilcoxon Test Result 
for the Means 
at a=.05
ANKARA 8.9838 7.98 1.860 Reject Ho -196 -5
AFYON 7.6951 8.53 1.833 Reject Ho -180 -4
BALIKESİR 6.0918 6.18 1.943 Reject Ho 15 40 0.0040 Reject Ho -176 -3 Reject Ho
SÖKE 5.5077 12.25 1.872 Reject Ho -145 -2
TRAKYA 5.4968 6.06 1.943 Reject Ho -122 -1
OVERALL 12.7429 73.26 1.645 Reject Ho {T+} 0
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Table 20: DEBT TO ASSETS (LEV) = Total Debt/Total Assets
Before Pr vatization Years
Year -7 Year -6 Year -5 Year -4 Year -3 Year-2 Year -1
Average
Xb
Standard 
Dev. Sb
ANKARA 0.6712 0.3603 0.4459 1.1851 0.7908 0.7548 0.1027 0.6158 0.3499
AFYON 0.5171 0.5481 0.2695 43.5321 ^0.4959 0.5155 2.6098 6.9269 16.1614
BALIKESİR 0.3704 0.3573 0.3772 0.2889 3.5174 0.3736 0.0367 0.7602 1.2219
NİĞDE 0.3413  ^ 0 .0 2 2 2 0.1978 0.6230 0.7031 0.3775 0.2855
SÖKE 0.6826 0.2622 0.3543 0.0094 0.4187 0.5037 0.4758 0.3867 0.2118
TRAKYA 0.1196 1.5486 0.1415 0.0080 0.3913 0.4058 0.4193 0.4334 0.5182
r  1.5834 6.8249
After Privatization Years
Average StandardYear +1 Year +2 Year +3 Year +4 Year +5 Year -1-6 Year +7 Xa Dev. Sa
ANKARA 0.9738 0.6136 0.4618 0.6662 0.7004 0.5857 0.6027 0.6577 0.1583
AFYON 0.5093 0.7499 0.8039 0.6643 0.7258 0.6939 0.5837 0.6758 0.1009
BALIKESİR 0.6767 0.6807 0.6954 0.5888 0.5019 0.5083 0.6023 0.6077 0.0809
NİĞDE 0.5962 0.3970 0.3811 0.3435 0.3124 0.4060 0.1113
SÖKE 0.6697 0.5648 0.7430 0.6029 0.4005 0.2904 0.7187 0.5700 0.1683
TRAKYA 0.7312 0.7908 0.7811 0.4782 0.5557 0.4663 0.2814 0.5835 0.1918
0.5835 0.1560
T-Statistic Degrees Critical Result Sum of Sum of Critical Wilcoxon Test Result Difference Rank Wilcoxon Test Resultfor Means of Freedom T-value Ranks Ranks Value for the Medians Between for the Meansat a=.05 Wa Wb at a=.05 Means at a=.05ANKARA -0.2888 9.14 1.883 Fail to reject Ho 0.0419 2
AFYON 1.0233 6 .0 0 1.943 Fail to reject Ho -6.2510 -6
BALIKESİR 0.3295 6.07 1.943 Fail to reject Ho 49 29 0.9535 Fail to reject Hq -0.1525 -4 Fail to reject Hq
NİĞDE -0.2466 5.78 1.943 Fail to reject Ho 0.0286 1
SÖKE -1.7931 13.22 1.771 Fail to reject Ho 0.1833 5
TRAKYA -0.7187 8.15 1.860 Fail to reject Ho 0.1501 3
OVERALL 0.9264 39.04 1.645 Fail to reject Ho r 11
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Table 21: LONG-TERM DEBT TO EQUITY (LEV2) = Long-Term Debt / Equity
Before Privatization Years
Year -7 Year -6 Year-5 Year -4 Year-3 Year -2 Year -1
Average
Xb
Standard 
Dev. Sb
ANKARA -0.0103 -0.0066 -0.1376 -0.9791 0.1812 0.8675 0.5677 0.0690 0.5848
AFYON 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 29.9937 0.0815 0.0537 0.0315 4.3086 11.3261
BALIKESİR 0.1954 0.0310 0.0091 0.0000 0.0384 0.0521 0.0306 0.0509 0.0661
NİĞDE 0.0448 0.0365 0.3977 r 0.7633 1.2248 0.4934 0.5067
SÖKE -0.0357 -0.0514 0.0000 1.0000 0.0623 0.0426 0.0203 0.1483 0.3777
TRAKYA 0.0000 0.0027 0.0001 0.4402 0.0125 0.0613 0.0234 0.0772 0.1615
0.8579 4.7353
After Privatization Years
Year -1-1 Year -1-2 Year -1-3 Year -1-4 Year -1-5 Year -1-6 Year -1-7
Average
Xa
Standard 
Dev. Sa
ANKARA 0.3493 0.0458 0.4860 1.2656 1.8841 0.7165 0.9157 0.8090 0.6168
AFYON 0.0000 0.2224 21.2282 1.1956 0.8601 5.9767 0.4051 4.2697 7.7581
BALIKESİR 0.6790 1.1039 0.9268 0.6196 0.2764 0.2180 0.5285 0.6217 0.3214
NİĞDE 0.6930 0.3243 0.3301 0.3162 0.2203 0.3768 0.1824
SÖKE 0.1839 0.0790 0.8040 0.9266 0.0680 0.0723 0.4041 0.3626 0.3647
TRAKYA 0.9629 1.3615 1.5616 1.9429 0.5647 0.2698 0.0902 0.9648 0.6926
1.2341 3.3804
T-Statistic 
for Means
Degrees 
of Freedom
Critical 
T-value 
at a=.05
Result Sum of 
Ranks
Wa
Sum of 
Ranks 
Wb
Critical 
Value 
at a=.05
Wilcoxon Test Result 
for the Medians
Difference
Between
Means
Rank Wilcoxon Test Result 
for the Means 
at a=.05
ANKARA -2.3035 13.95 1.761 Fail to reject Ho 0.7400 5
AFYON 0.0075 12.15 1.782 Fail to reject Ho -0.0389 -1
BALIKESİR -4.6027 6.68 1.895 Fail to reject Ho Fail to reject Ho 0.5708 4 Fail to reject Ho
NİĞDE 0.5731 5.53 1.895 Fail to reject Ho -0.1167 -2
SÖKE -1.0796 13.98 1.761 Fail to reject Ho 0.2142 3
TRAKYA -3.3021 6.87 1.895 Fail to reject Ho 0.8876 6
ÖVERALL -0.4089 72.17 1.645 Fail to reject Ho {T+} 18
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V.7 Summary of the Findings
Table 22 summarizes the results of the t-test and Wilcoxon tests for the six on overall in 
terms of each criteria. For other than real sales, all of the tests are consistent with each 
other. Profitability , shows no significant improvement after privatization, on the contrary 
there is a significant amount of decrease in profitability that can be seen in the results of t- 
test on the overall in Tables 13-15. Whether the profitability has a significant decline after 
privatization are not tested with the other tests, Wilcoxon signed rank test and Wilcoxon 
rank test, since this subject is beyond the scope of this study.
Operating efficiency shows improvement in terms of sales efficiency while it shows no 
significant improvement in terms of net income efficiency. Net income efficiency 
decreased on the overall according to t-test (See Table 17). The main reasons for that are 
discussed in the sixth part.
In real sales, the result of t-test and Wilcoxon rank test is the failure to reject the null 
hypothesis. However, Wilcoxon signed rank test concludes that null hypothesis is rejected.
Employment decreases in each company and on the overall as expected. This is quite 
normal since the companies laid off many employees after privatization.
Leverage has no significant change after privatization. Actually, a decrease in the leverage 
is expected after privatization since the cost of borrowing increase for the private firms. 
The main reason for no significant change may be the obligation of firms to make 
investments in the first five years of the privatization and firms financing those 
investments by debt.
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Table 22: Results of T-test and Wilcoxon Rank Tests for the Six Companies
Characteristics Performance Measures T-Test Results
Wilcoxon 
Rank Test 
Results
(Median)
Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank 
Test Results
(Mean)
Profitability Return on Sales 
Return on Assets 
Return on Equity
Fail to reject Ho 
Fail to reject H„ 
Fail to reject H„
Fail to reject Ho 
Fail to reject Ho 
Fail to reject Ho
Fail to reject Ho 
Fail to reject Ho 
Fail to reject Ho
Operating Sales Efficiency Reject Ho Reject Ho Reject Ho
Efficiency Net Income Efficiency Fail to reject Ho Fail to reject Ho Fail to reject H«
Output Real Sales Fail to reject Ho Fail to reject H„ Reject H„
Employment Total Employment Reject Ho Reject H„ Reject Ho
Leverage Debt to Assets 
Long-Term Debt to Equity
Fail to reject H« 
Fail to reject Ho
Fail to reject Ho 
Fail to reject H„
Fail to reject Ho 
Fail to reject Ho
Tabic 23 summarizes the results of the t-test to compare each company’s pre- and post­
privatization performance. Most of the time, the expectations about the performances are not 
revealed. Just the employment for each company and the net income efficiency for Söke 
resulted in the rejection of the null hypothesis, thus meaning that the expectations are revealed 
in those cases.
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Table 23; Results of T-test for Each Company
Ankara Afyon Balikesir Nigde Soke Trakya
Return on Sales (ROS) FTR Ho FTR Ho FTR Ho FTR Ho FTR H„ FTRHo
Return on Assets (ROA) FTR Ho FTR Ho FTR Ho FTR Ho FTR H„ FTRHo
Return on Equity (ROE) FTRH„ FTR Ho FTR Ho FTR Ho FTR Ho FTRHo
Sales Efficiency (SALEFF) RH„ RH„ RH„ n.a. RH„ RH„
Net Income Efficiency (NIEFF) FTR Ho FTR Ho FTR Ho n.a. FTR Ho FTR Ho
Real Sales (SAL) FTR H„ FTR Ho FTR H„ FTRH„ FTR H„ FTRHo
Total Employment (EMPL) RH„ RHo RH„ n.a. RH„ RH„
Debt to Assets (LEV) FFR Ho FTR Ho FTR Ho FTR Ho FTRH„ FTR Ho
Long-Term Debt to Equity (LEV2) FTR H„ FTR H„ FI’R H„ FTR H„ FTR H„ FTRH„
FTR Ho : Fail to reject null hypothesis 
R Ho ; Reject null hypothesis
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VI. CONCLUSION
Two different conclusions are drawn from this study. First one is the overall assessment of the 
privatizaton program in Turkey. Second part examines the performance of the privatization in 
cement industry.
VI. 1 Overall Assessment of The Privatizaton Program in Turkey
The success of a privatization program is measured by:
• The extent to which it produced desired changes in the composition and size of the public 
sector,
• Whether it was accomplished as fast as planned,
• Whether the privatized enterprises became more efficient under private ownership,
• Whether the economy’s overall efficiency improved,
• Whether privatization helped meet fiscal objectives,
• Whether social objectives associated with privatization were met.
(World Bank, 1994)
Although Turkey had made a strong commitment to privatization in 1983 when Turgut Ozal 
was the Prime Minister, the implementation phases were painstakingly slow. The main reason 
of that was,the frequent government changes, bringing different views on privatization 
program, and the fear of losing political vote potential by changing an on-going system where 
the interest groups and rentiers were a lot.
At the beginning of each year, the targets were set for the privatization program for the 
coming year. However, none of the actual sales were matching with the pre-set target values
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at year ends. There had been a big lag between the plans and the actual outcomes causing a 
mistrust among public against privatization policies.
Worldwide, the revenues from the sale of the SOEs are used for the rehabilitation and 
modernization of the SOEs. In Turkey, the main objective of the privatization is the desire to 
get rid of the financial burden of the SOEs, and that money is used to pay the debt liabilities 
and interest payments of the Government.
Insufficient stock market and the low level of savings of the public cause the sales to be in the 
form of block sales. This situation can not prevent monopolization. There occurs monopoly / 
oligopoly since the shares of the companies are usually bought in large amounts by some 
powerful other firms. Besides some of those are the monopolies formed by foreign firms. In 
Turkey, we need to take possible actions in both economical and legal terms to prevent the 
formation of the monopolies. Although the anti-trust law is enacted, still there is no anti-trust 
committee.
The Government’s commitment to the privatization is a must. The Government borrows large 
amount of money from the World Bank for implementation of privatization program, however 
there are lots of problems with the effective use of those loans. During the implementation of 
the projects, some components of the project were revised so that there was little or no action 
pertaining to the original project components causing waste of money and waste of time such 
as the situation in Siimerbank component. " While the Bank staff (both programs and project 
staff) made a strong effort to keep the selected SOEs involved, we probably perceived that in 
view of Turkish Government's commitment to the Bank in the context of the project, their 
participation in the project was a requirement rather than a voluntary decision. " stated in the 
Project Completion Report of the Technical Assistance Project for the State Economic 
Enterprises that was funded by the World Bank.
The acceptance of the privatization concept and the need for the management’s desire to 
participate in the efforts are other crucial issues. There is a great resistance to change among 
the management who are afraid of losing their power, and the employees who are facing the 
risk of losing their jobs. The resistance among the employees can be decreased by forming an 
effective social safety net.
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VI. 2 Performance Analysis of the Privatized Companies in Cement Industry
The analysis part of this study to measure the performanee of the privatization of a sample of 
six eement companies reveals the fact that the expectations from the privatization are not 
realized (Just two of the nine expectations are met on the overall). According to t-test and 
Wilcoxon tests (both for means and medians) , after privatization, all profitability ratios 
(return on sales, return on assets, return on equity), net income efficiency, leverages do not 
have any significant improvements. Expectations hold for the sales efficiency and the 
employment. Sales efficiency increases after privatization while employment declines.
Profitability ratios do not show significant improvement after privatization, on the contrary 
there is a significant amount of decrease in profitability that can be seen in the results of t-test 
on the overall in Tables 13-15. Wilcoxon signed rank test and Wilcoxon rank test are not 
employed to test whether the profitability has a significant decline after privatization, since 
this subject is beyond the scope of this study.
Operating efficiency shows improvement in terms of sales efficiency while there is no 
significant improvement in terms of net income efficiency. Net income efficiency decreased 
on the overall according to t-test as seen in Table 17. There might be two reasons for the net 
income efficiency to decrease while sales increase on the overall. First of all, in pre­
privatization years, managers of the state owned enterprises might be willing to show their 
net income more than the actual amount in order to be seen operating well which can be called 
as ‘Window Dressing’. Second reason might be that, in post-privatization years, the private 
companies might be adjusting their profits by overvaluing their expenditures in order to pay 
less tax.
The conflicting results are got for real sales. T-test and Wilcoxon rank test conclude that there 
is no significant improvement in output. However, Wilcoxon signed rank test results in the 
rejection of the null hypothesis concluding an improvement after privatization.
Employment decreases in each company and on the overall as expected since the companies 
laid off many employees after privatization.
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Leverage has no significant change after privatization. Actually, a decrease in the leverage is 
expected after privatization since the cost of borrowing increase for the private firms. The 
obligation of firms to make investments in the first five years of the privatization and firms 
financing those by debt might be the reason for not decreasing leverage.
Among the studies that are done to measure the performance of the privatization, Sui9mez 
(1995) intended to measure the profitability and the productivity of the privatization in the 
cement industry in Turkey with the help of return on sales ratio and labour productivity. He 
concluded that productivity improved while profitability deteriorated. The hypothesis that the 
privatization increases labour productivity, in some extent, is true in Turkey because most of 
the companies laid off almost one third of their employees and the production levels usually 
increased due to the investments in technology and know-how. His analysis is not a 
comprehensive one since he studies on just two criteria for five companies. His results on the 
profitability may be regarded as consistent with the results that are got by t-test of this study to 
measure the overall profitability.
Megginson, Nash and Vishy (1994) on their analysis of comparison of pre- and post­
privatization financial and operating performance of 61 companies from 18 countries and 32 
industries done with Wilcoxon signed rank test concluded significant increase in profitability, 
output per employee (adjusted for inflation) and total employment. The results of the cement 
industry in Turkish case are quite the contrary to these results. In their study, leverage is lower 
after privatization. For leverage, there is no significant difference between the pre- and post­
privatization values in this thesis’ research.
Actually, the sample size is not large enough . Six companies’ financial data over the seven 
years pre-privatization and seven years post-privatization are not enough to reach at a certain 
conclusion about the performance of the privatization program in cement industry. Despite the 
sample size limitation, the results of all tests (t-test for means, Wilcoxon signed rank test and 
Wilcoxon rank test) are consistent. Further study with larger sample size may be helpful to 
come up with certain results on whether privatization has made significant improvement in 
cement industry and to make a comparison with the results of this study.
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Appendix 1: Completely Privatized Companies
Name of the Company % of Shares Sold
Adıyaman Çimento T.A.Ş. 100.00
Aşkale Çimento T.A.Ş. 100.00
Denizli Çimento T.A.Ş. 100.00
İskenderun Çimento T.A.Ş. 100.00
Karabük Demir Çelik Fabrikası 100.00
Ladik Çimento T.A.Ş. 100.00
Lalapaşa Çimento T.A.Ş. 100.00
Ordu Soya Sanayi A.Ş. 100.00
Sivas Çimento Sanayi T.A.Ş. 100.00
SÜMERBANK A.Ş. 100.00
Şanlıurfa Çimento Sanayi T.A.Ş. 100.00
Trabzon Çimento Sanayi T.A.Ş. 100.00
USAŞ Uçak Servisi A.Ş. 100.00
Van Çimento Sanayi T.A.Ş. 100.00
Trakya (Pmarhisar) Çimento Sanayi T.A.Ş. 99.90
Elazığ Çimento Sanayi T.A.Ş. 99.89
Çorum Çimento Sanayi T.A.Ş. 99.85
Niğde Çimento Sanayi T.A.Ş. 99.84
Bartın Çimento Sanayi T.A.Ş. 99.79
KÜMAŞ Kütahya Manyezit İşletmeleri A.Ş. 99.74
Gaziantep Çimento Sanayi T.A.Ş. 99.73
Söke Çimento Sanayi T.A.Ş. 99.60
Afyon Çimento Sanayi T.A.Ş. 99.59
Ankara Çimento Sanayi T.A.Ş. 99.30
ÇİN KUR Çinko Kurşun Metal Sanayi A.Ş. 98.80
Balıkesir Çimento Sanayi T.A.Ş. 98.30
GİMA Gıda ve İhtiyaç Mad. T.A.Ş. 98.20
NİMSA Niğde Meysu ve Gıda SAn. A.Ş. 97.80
Meysu A.Ş. 96.15
Gümüşhane Çimento Sanayi T.A.Ş. 95.46
ANSAN Ankara Meşrubat Sanayi A.Ş. 88.33
Köytaş Köy Tarım Makinaları A.Ş. 85.59
T.O.E.Türk Otomotiv Endüstrisi A.Ş. 81.35
Güneysu A.Ş. 67.31
Adana Kağıt Torba Sanayii T.A.Ş. 60.00
Bursa Soğuk Depoculuk Ltd. Şti. 52.00
İpragaz A.Ş. 51.00
Ray Sigorta A.Ş. 49.65
Ünye Çimento Sanayii T.A.Ş. 49.21
Çay bank A.Ş. 49.00
NETAŞ Northern Elektrik Telekom A.Ş. 49.00
Binaş - Bingöl Yem ve Süt A.Ş. 47.50
Adana Çimento Sanayi T.A.Ş. 47.28
Mardin Çimento Sanayi A.Ş. 46.23
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Appendix 1 (Continued): Completely Privatized Companies
Name of the Company % of Shares Sold
Eskişehir Yem Fabrikası A.Ş. 45.00
Trakmak Traktör ve Ziraat Mak. A.Ş. 45.00
Türk Traktör ve Ziraat Makinaları A.Ş. 44.97
Pan Tohum Islah Üretme A.Ş. 43.93
Kepez Elektrik A.Ş. 43.68
Migros Türk T.A.Ş. 42.22
Polinas Plastik Sanayi T.A.Ş. 40.67
TELETAŞ Telekom End. ve Tic. A.Ş. 40.00
İstanbul Demir Çelik Sanayi A.Ş. 40.00
Biga Yem Fabrikası A.Ş. 40.00
Aksaray Yem Fabrikası A.Ş. 40.00
Konya Çimento Sanayi A.Ş. 39.87
SUNTEK Ağır isi Sanayi A.Ş. 39.00
AEG Eti Elektrik A.Ş. 38.96
Türkkablo A.O. 38.00
Kars Yem Fabrikası A.Ş. 37.07
Bolu Çimento Sanayi A.Ş. 35.33
Şeker Sigorta A.Ş. 31.00
Güneş Sigorta A.Ş. 30.00
Çorum Yem Fabrikası A.Ş. 30.00
ALTEK Elek. Sant. Tes. İşit, ve Tic. A.Ş. 29.28
Çelik Halat ve Tel Sanayi A.Ş. 28.00
MEKTA Ticaret A.Ş. 26.83
Çamsan Ağaç SAnayi T.A.Ş. 25.45
Çukurova Elektrik A.Ş. 25.00
Toros Zirai İlaç Ve Pazarlama A.Ş. 25.00
SAMAŞ Sanayi Madenleri A.Ş. 24.60
Bandırma Yem Fabrikası Ltd. Şti. 24.00
Konya Şeker Fabrikası A.Ş. 20.00
YEMTA A.Ş. 17.27
Tat Konserve Sanayi A.Ş. 17.00
Hascan Gıda Endüstrisi A.Ş. 16.00
Pancar Motor Sanayi A.Ş. 15.66
Fruko Tamek Meyve Suları San. A.Ş. 15.00
Manisa Yem Fabrikaları A.Ş. 15.00
İsparta Yem Fabrikası A.Ş. 15.00
Arçelik A.Ş. 14.77
DİTAŞ Doğan Yedek Parça İmalat A.Ş. 14.77
ABANA Elektromekanik San. A.Ş. 13.50
Sivas Yem Fabrikası A.Ş. 13.37
Kayseri Yem Fabrikası A.Ş. 13.33
Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası A.Ş. 11.68
Şekerbank T.A.Ş. 10.00
Aroma Bursa Meyve Suları San. A.Ş. 9.17
Ankara Halk Ekmek Un Fabrikası A.Ş. 6.63
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Appendix 1 (Continued): Completely Privatized Companies
Name of the Company % of Shares Sold
Çanakkale Seramik Fabrikaları A.Ş. 5.80
Tamek Gıda Sanayi A.Ş. 5.54
Hektaş Ticaret T.A.Ş. 5.47
Layne Bowler Dik l'ürbin Pomp. A.Ş. 4.17
ÇESTAŞ Çukurova FJektrik A.Ş. 2.29
Source: Privatization Administration Bulletin, January 1, 1997
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Appendix 2: The Sales in January 1997 That are Waiting for the Approval of PHC
Company Sales Amount
($ )
Tekirdağ Harbour 134,558,509
Antalya Harbour 102,520,769
Hopa Harbour 4,004,718
Giresun Harbour 3,203,774
Rize Harbour 5,606605
Ordu Harbour 1,607,887
Sinop Harbour 800,944
I'rabzon Harbour -
Akçay Holiday Village 5,300,000
Ürgüp Hotel 3,500,000
Akçay Land 460,000
Akçay Land 175,000
Filyos Brick 18,150,000
Konya Chrome 40,070,000
Ergani Cement 46,700,000
Kurtalan Cement 22,705,000
Bozüyük Cement 8,830,000
Cemaş Casting 2,150,000
Cimhol Cement 900,000
Petlas 35,750,000
Deniz Transportation 142,255,000
TOTAL 579,248,000
Source: Sabah Newspaper, January 15, 1997
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Appendix 3; Companies In The Privatization Portfolio
Name of the Company Industry Type PA
Share
(%)
EBK Et ve Balık Ürünleri A.Ş. Meat, Fish, Poultry 100.00
Etibank Bankacılık A.O. Banking 100.00
Anadolubank A.Ş. Banking 100.00
Denizbank A.Ş. Banking 100.00
Hamitabat Elektrik Üretim ve l icaret A.Ş. Power Generations 100.00
Kemerköy Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret A.Ş. Power Generations 100.00
ORÜS Orman Ürünleri Sanayi A.Ş. (1) Forestry Wood Materials Manuf. 100.00
SEK Süt Ürünleri A.Ş. (1) Milk and Diary Products 100.00
Soma Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret A.Ş. Power Generations 100.00
SÜMER Holding A.Ş. (1) Textile, Leather, Ceramics, 
Carpet
100.00
T. Gemi Sanayi A.Ş. Vessel Construction 100.00
T.Denizcilik İşletmeleri (1) Maritime 100.00
TURBAN Turizm A.Ş. (1) Tourism 100.00
TÜRK Telekominikasyon A.Ş. Telecommunications 100.00
YEMSAN Yem Sanayi A.Ş. (1) Animal Feed Production 100.00
Yeniköy Elekrik Üretim ve Ticaret A.Ş. Power Generations 100.00
Ergani Çimento Sanayi A.Ş. Cement 100.00
Kurtalan Çimento Sanayi Ticaret A.Ş. Cement 100.00
Bozüyük Seramik Sanayi A.Ş. Ceramic 100.00
Filyos Ateş Tuğlası Sanayi Ticaret A.Ş. Refractory Brick 100.00
Konya Krom Magnezit Tuğla Ticaret A.Ş. Refractory Brick 100.00
Yarımca Porselen Sanayi Ticaret A.Ş. ^orcelain 100.00
Sivas Demir Çelik İşletmeleri A.Ş. (1) Chromium Extraction 99.98
KBÎ-Karadeniz Bakır İşletmeleri A.Ş. Copper 99.97
ÇİTOSAN Çimento ve Toprak Sanayi T.A.Ş. folding Company 99.96
PETLAS Lastik Sanayi A.Ş. Tire Manufacturing 99.96
Deniz Nakliyatı T.A.Ş. Sea Freight 99.92
TESTAŞ T. Elektronik Sanayi Ticaret A.Ş. (1) Electronics 99.91
KÖYTEKS Yatırım Holding A.Ş. (1) nvestment 99.84
Meybuz A.Ş. Food Frozing and Transportation 99.57
THY - Türk Hava Yolları A.Ş. (1) Airline 98.17
rÜPICAŞ Türkiye Petrol Rafinerileri A.Ş. (1) Petroleum Refining 96.42
PETKİM Petrokimya Holding A.Ş. (1) Petrochemicals 95.86
Petrol Ofisi A.Ş. (1) 'Gasoline and Fuel Oil Marketing 
and Distribution
93.30
TÜSTAŞ Sınai Tesisleri A.Ş. Engineering/ Consulting 57.52
Ereğli Demir Çelik Fabrikaları A.Ş. ron and Steel 51.66
DİTAŞ Deniz İşletmeciliği ve Tankerciliği ; 
A.Ş.
ÇEMAŞ Döküm Sanayi T.A.Ş.
Sea Transportation of Crude Oil 50.96
Steel Casting 49.61
Gönen Gıda Sanayi A.Ş. Rood 49,00
rÜMAŞ Türk Müh. Müş. ve Müt. A.Ş. Engineering/ Consulting 49,00
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Appendix 3 (Continued): Companies In The Privatization Portfolio
Name of the Company Industry Type PA
Share
(%)
ETİTAŞ Elektrik Tec. İmal. Tesisat A.Ş. Electric Equipment 46.64
HAVAŞ Havaalanları Yer Hizmetleri A.Ş. (1) Airport Handling Services 40,00
ÇİMHOL Çimento ve Yan Mamülleri San. Holding 30.42
A.Ş.
SOY-TEK Elektrik Sant. Tes. İşit, ve Ticaret Power Generation 30,00
A.Ş.
KAYSERİ Civan Elektrik T.A.Ş. Electricity 20,00
Metal Kapak Sanayi A.Ş. Metal Lid 18.66
Tol'aş Oto Ticaret A.Ş. (1) Automobile Distributor 17.23
Toros Gübre ve Kimya Endüstrisi A.Ş. Fertilizer 14.48
YERTEKS Tekstil San. ve Ticaret A.Ş. Textile 10,00
Pınar Entegre Et A.Ş. Meat 5.76
MAKSAN Malatya Makina Kimya Sanayi Machinery 2.50
A.Ş.
l ’ofaş Türk Otomobil Fabrikaları A.Ş. (1) Automobile Manufacturing 1.95
İMSA İstanbul Meşrubat Sanayi A.Ş. Beverages 1.01
Aksaray Azmi Milli T.A.Ş. Flour 0.91
ASELSAN A.Ş. Electronics 0.27
■Source: Privatization Administration Bulletin, January 1, 1997
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Appendix 4: Privatized Cement Companies By Privatization Type
Privatization
Type
Name of the 
Company
% of
Shares
Sold
Purchased By
Sales Date Sales
Amount
($)
Block Sale Ankara
Balıkesir
Trakya
Söke
Gaziantep
İskenderun
Trabzon
Denizli
Çorum
Sivas
Ladik
Şanlıurfa
Bartın
Aşkale
Adıyaman
Elazığ
Van
Lalapaşa
Kars
99.30
98.30 
99.90 
99.60 
99.73
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
99.78
100.00
100.00
99.89
100.00
100.00
100.00
Société Cement Français 
Société Cement Français 
Société Cement Français 
Société Cernent Français 
Rumeli Holding 
Oyak- H. Ömer Sabancı 
Rumeli Holding 
Modem Çimento 
Yibitaş Holding 
Yibitaş Holding 
Rumeli Holding 
Rumeli Holding 
Rumeli Holding 
Erçimsan 
Teksko A.Ş. 
Oyak/ Gama 
Rumeli Holding 
Rumeli Holding 
Çimentaş
8/9/89
8/9/89
8/9/89
8/9/89
3/12/92
2/12/92
3/12/92
4/12/92
25/12/92
25/12/92
21/4/93
21/4/92
6/5/92
17/6/93
16/8/95
12/6/96
12/6/96
14/6/96
18/6/96
33.000. 000
23.000. 000
25.000. 000
11.000. 000
52,695,898
61.500.000
32.551.000
70.100.000 
35,000,000
29.400.000 
57,598,687 
57,405,988 
20,568,669
31.158.000
52.500.000
27.850.000
24.500.000 
125,890,000
2,225,000
TOTAL 792,968,242
Public
Offering
Bolu
Konya
Ünye
Mardin
Adana
10.38
31.13
2.86
25.46
34.32
April, 1990 
Nov., 1990 
Nov., 1990 
Nov., 1990 
Feb., 1991
TOTAL
8,268,150
17,663,979
927,162
9,161,501
27,958,470
63,979,262
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Appendix 4 (Continued): Privatized Cement Companies By Privatization Type
Privat izcition 
I'ype
Name of the 
Company
%of
Shares
Sold
Purchased By
Sales
Date
Sales Amount
($)
Public Afyon Block SCF Sep., 13,000,000
Offering and Sale; 1989
Block Sale 51.00
Public _ March, 8,422,698
Off. : 1991
39.87
Niğde Block Oyak- H. Ömer Sabancı May, 2,647,286
Sale: 1991
12.72
Public _ March, 22,500,000
Off. : 1992
87.10
TOTAL Block 15,647,286
Sale
Public 30,922,698
Off.
TOTAL Block
Sale
808,615,528
Public
Off.
94,901,960
GENERAL TOTAL 903,517,488
vSource: Privatization Administration Bulletin, January 1, 1997
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